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Katrina’s Window: Localism, Re-segregation
and Equitable Regionalism
David D. Troutt

Abstract

The worst national disaster in United States history also showcased the dire consequences of localism as the cultural and legal successor to de jure segregation.
Long before Hurricanes Katrina and Rita devastated the Gulf Coast, New Orleans’
status as an exceptional city had been lost to Americanizing trends. Its resistance
to the conventional racial binary was overcome after Reconstruction; its unique
densities and accommodation of the physical landscape were transformed into
sprawling divisions by technology and suburbanization. From the Brown decision
forward, New Orleans and the metropolitan area around it developed much like the
rest of the nation. Localist tendencies combined with legal protections for local
autonomy—as exemplified and supported by several key decisions of the Burger
Court—to re-segregate the region. A decade before Katrina, New Orleans, like
most central cities, was financially incapable of deconcentrating neighborhoods
of persistent poverty and politically powerless to wrest a more equitable sharing
of state fiscal resources and burdens from its neighboring parishes.
Part II examines the history of New Orleans as a city central to American concepts of racialized space, from slavery to Katrina. Part III argues that localism
became the jurisprudential edifice that supplanted de jure segregation there and
elsewhere after Brown. Its underlying notions of economic rationalism and colorblind innocence have since been reinforced by decentalization, consumption,
political fragmentation and black middle-class antipathy for integration to resegregate metropolitan America. Part IV argues that this analytic focus on the
role of “legal localism” in re-segregating America’s metropolitan regions compels its own remedial principle: equitable regionalism. Under this principle of
local government law reform, political coalitions may be possible in joining the
interests of antipoverty, fair housing and community development advocates with

their counterparts in smartgrowth, environmental preservation and antisprawl organizations. Urban neighborhoods chronically destabilized by poverty need localism’s emphasis on participation through planning devices; similar devices may
help to effectuate equitable regional goals. The current antimajoritarian rules have
weakened both cities and a great many suburbs, suggesting ultimately that what
benefits the isolated urban poor may also improve the welfare of the suburban
middle class.

Katrina’s Window:
Localism, Re-segregation and Equitable Regionalism
By David D. Troutt*
The promise of [New Orleans] is the lesson that could be learned from that city at
its best. When the people are doing what they do naturally, blending a seamless
culture that has a oneness about it that very few places in the rest of this country
have, we could teach America how to be America—if anybody’s listening.**
The Negro has indicated tremendous concern about his suspected confinement to
the first ward. At almost every one of the Planning Board meetings, collectively
they have stated they do not feel that any residential use should be allowed to
remain in the first ward. In piercing through what they say, what they really mean
is don't keep us in the first ward, let us live where our income or our desires allow
us. You have a tremendous pressure building up in your community on the part of
the non-whites to go across the bridge.***

Part I: Introduction
Like so many images and incidents from the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in
New Orleans, the decision by Jefferson Parish police to close the Gretna Bridge to
evacuees fleeing the flooded city three days after the storm has become metaphor for a
damaged social contract. Witnesses, mostly black, reported police, mostly white, firing
warning shots over their heads and angrily denying them passage through the West Bank

*

Professor of Law and Justice John J. Francis Scholar, Rutgers Law School-Newark. I wish to thank
Derrick Bell and John Payne for their thoughtful comments on early drafts of this article. I am also grateful
for the feedback I received from participants after presenting many of these ideas at the First Annual
Critical Race Theory Seminar at UCLA Law School as well as before policymakers at the Institute for
Regional and Community Transformation. I am deeply indebted to Maritza Braswell for her thoroughness
and ingenuity in providing outstanding research assistance for this Article, as well as to Dennis Kim-Prieto
in the library. I learned a lot from the many gracious people I interviewed in New Orleans. All mistakes
are mine.
**
John T. Scott, artist, interviewed about New Orleans for American Experience on PBS, February 12,
2007.
***
Kennedy Park Homes Asso. v. Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108, 110 (2d Cir. 1970)(city’s planning
consultant’s testimony to the Planning development Board in February 1968).
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suburb.1 Police spokesmen asserted that mayhem had begun to ensue, that the parish’s
resources were taxed after busing evacuees, and that New Orleans was a better rescue
point.2 But the public reactions were telling: Jefferson Parish residents praised their
police for keeping outsiders out, outsiders filed civil rights lawsuits,3 and the national
public took umbrage at another apparent instance of callous official indifference.
Yet the Gretna Bridge incident reflects something more complicated and less
often acknowledged about New Orleans-as-metaphor for America’s social contract after
the August 2005 storm. It demonstrates the importance of city-suburb boundaries—
jurisdictional borders, specifically—in the social identification of space and safety, and
how under what I call legal localism, a suburban locality’s police powers are routinely
used to affirm expectations segregated by both race and class. In fact, there have been
several defensive exercises of local authority in the post-Katrina environment, including
St. Bernard Parish’s enactment of an ordinance preventing homeowners from renting out
their homes to anyone other than a blood relative without a permit,4 a Jefferson Parish
resolution barring construction of any multifamily housing with the use of state-issued
tax credits,5 and statements by the St. Tammany Parish sheriff warning people with

1

See Bruce Hamilton, “Evacuees recount gunfire at bridge blockade; Gretna, Jeff officials defend Katrina
action,” New Orleans Times-Picayune, 2/26/06 at 1.
2
Id. The official characterizations of mayhem, looting and crime in and outside of New Orleans during the
immediate aftermath of the storm were often wrong and sometimes fatal. Perpetuated by black local
officials (e.g., New Orleans Mayor Ray. C. Nagin and Police Chief W__ Compass) as well as national
news media correspondents, the reports of widespread lawlessness fit a set of preconceived beliefs about
the largely black poor devastated by the flooding, justified a slower, militarized response from rescuers,
and may have delayed critical rescues for sickly and dehydrated survivors. For a full discussion of the
implications of racial framing that occurred in the storm coverage, please see Cheryl Harris and Devon
Carbado, “Loot or Find?” in David Dante Troutt, ed., After the Storm: Black Intellectuals Explore the
Meaning of Hurricane Katrina (The New Press 2006).
3
See Paul Purpura, “Court explores evacuees’ right to cross bridge; Gretna, police chief face Katrina
lawsuit,” New Orleans Times-Picayune, 1/25/07 at 1.
4
Bill Quigley, “Eighteen Months After Katrina,” Truthout (February 27, 2007) available at,
http://www.truthout.org/docs_2006/022707N.shtml
5
Id.
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dreadlocks or "chee wee hairstyles" that they could "expect to be getting a visit from a
sheriff's deputy."6
By legal localism, I am referring to both the ideology of local governance that is
central to most scholarship on local government law as well as its legal sense, codified in
decades of state law decisions that combined with private industry actors and federal
policies to build a fortified suburbia around the nation’s great cities, and whose rules of
exclusion were ultimately upheld against constitutional attack by a series of Supreme
Court decisions in the 1970s. Legal localism, I argue here, is the legal form of the
American Dream and the template for our social contract. For the mostly white suburban
parishes that comprise the New Orleans metropolitan area, legal localism is the formal
triumph of a long historical process of what Arnold Hirsch called “Americanization.”7 In
this analysis, New Orleans is not just any American city. It is perhaps the American city
reflecting the struggle between urban potential and racial identity. Its history of racial
and caste complexity before Reconstruction, the geographic barriers to its expansion, the
sometimes violent ebb and flow of its race relations, the ideological battles over equality
and Jim Crow segregation, and its ultimate white flight to sprawling suburbs which left
behind national extremes of concentrated black poverty and urban decline represented—
before Katrina—a mirror to the country’s failures of residential organization. However,
after Katrina, when even the President’s omission of the city’s recovery in his January
2007 State of the Union address suggested the depth of political fatigue around the
meaning of disaster, New Orleans is a window to the scope and content of metropolitan
law and policy reform in the United States.

6
7

Id.
See discussion at ___ infra.
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In most law and policy analyses concerned with poverty and even structural
inequality, there is a tendency to focus narrowly within the hardship, at the intersection of
marginality, or at least to stay on the city side of the bridge. The flaw in that focus
yielded the sort of national confusion around promised post-Katrina discussions of race
and class. Without a comparative perspective on poverty and the middle-class (or what I
have earlier described as an interdependence between “antimarkets” and
“metamarkets”)8, people lack meaningful context. So, the conversation rarely occurred
or lasted for long, and, at this writing, the story of New Orleans’ displaced poor will
likely become one of accidental migrations to an uneven diaspora.9
Yet Hurricane Katrina nevertheless revealed many randomly related “truths”
about the kind of lives Americans live and where they live them. First, “white flight” is
not a historical concept, but remains an accurate descriptor for the residential settlement
patterns of most white Americans—outside of large cities.10 Second, cities are still the
repositories of political disfavor, even contempt, “raced” by suburban development

8

See, e.g., Troutt, “Ghettoes Made Easy: The Metamarket/Antimarket Dichotomy and the Legal
Challenges of Inner-City Economic Development,” 35 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review
427 (2000) (the foundation article to the theory of antimarkets, the potential role of consumer
principles and an introduction to a legal paradigm for economic development in ghetto areas of American
cities).
9
See Shaila Dewan, “Road to New Life After Katrina Is Closed To Many,” The New York Times, July 12,
2007, p. A1 (describing the continuing struggles to find work, housing and stability among Katrina
survivors unable to return to New Orleans).
10
However, some important recent scholarship on Southern suburbanization does not fully agree with the
way this term is used. For instance, as Matthew D. Lassiter writes, “The interrelationship between
suburban expansion and urban retrenchment represents the most important framework for investigating
political realignment in postwar America, but the overemphasis on the metaphor of ‘white flight’ reduces
suburbanization to an appendage of urban history and provides an incomplete account of the development
of metropolitan space.” The Silent Majority: Suburban Politics in the Sunbelt South 9 (Princeton
University Press 2006). Undoubtedly, whites fled cities for suburbs after World War II for many more
reasons than fear or contempt of racial integration. In many cases, including New Orleans, lending rules
and real estate industry offerings made the suburbs more attractive and less expensive than continuing to
rent in cities. See generally Dolores Hayden, “Building the American Way: Public Subsidy, Private Space”
(2004) in Becky M. Nicolaides and Andrew Wiese, eds., The Suburb Reader (Routledge 2006)(describing
cost structures and public subsidies to homeowners and developers during the pre- and post-war suburban
housing booms).
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patterns as a synonym for costly black failure and legitimate white fear.11 Third, racial
and economic segregation are as much the norm today in America as they were, on
average, over the civil rights era.12 Fourth, whatever one may think of integration or the
personal factors contributing to persistent poverty, segregation works on particular
groups as an instrument of social and economic marginalization; the chronic absence of
resources that results for the undesirable objects of segregation—largely poor and
working-class blacks—contributes to cumulative disadvantages which are even harder to
overcome.13 Fifth, segregation accompanies suburban sprawl and enclavism, which
creates economic and environmental waste, a succession of declining communities and
disparities between middle-class and more affluent localities within a metropolitan area.14
The New Orleans region illustrated all of these phenomena before Katrina, which, despite
its rich history, resembled most of metropolitan America.
This Article seeks to provide analytic connective tissue between the tragedy of
cities like New Orleans and the underlying doctrines of marginalization embodied in our
most favored local government laws. I do so by telling a historical narrative of
residential organization, critiquing localism and ultimately arguing for principles of
11

See Jason Sokol, There Goes My Everything: White Southerners in the Age of Civil Rights, 1945-1975, 68 (Knopf 2006)(summarizing the range of reactions, including shock and fear, among ordinary white
Southerners as learned through personal narratives).
12
See John R. Logan, Ethnic Diversity Grows, Neighborhood Integration Lags Behind, Lewis Mumford
Center for Comparative Urban and Regional Research. University of Albany, SUNY, available at,
http://mumford.albany.edu/census/WholePop/WPreport/MumfordReport.pdf (provides an analysis of
trends in residential segregation between 1980 and 2000, and concludes that “residential segregation among
blacks and whites remains high in cities and in suburbs around the country. There were some signs of
progress in the 1980s, with a five-point drop in the segregation index (from 73.8 to 68.8). The change
continued at a slower rate in the 1990s (a decline of just under 4 points) . . . . at this pace it may take forty
more years for black-white segregation to come down even to the current level of Hispanic-white
segregation.” Id. at 1.)
13
See generally Douglas S. Massey and Nancy A. Denton, American Apartheid: Segregation and the
Making of the Underclass (Harvard 1993) and discussion at ___ infra.
14
See, e.g., Robert D. Bullard, Glenn S. Johnson, and Angel O. Torres, eds., Sprawl City: Race, Politics
and Planning in Atlanta 2-7 (Island Press 2000)(describing many of the negative effects of sprawl on cities
and older suburbs).

Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

Katrina’s Window

TROUTT

Page 6

metropolitan governance and land use regulation which I call equitable regionalism.
Many more capable scholars have done the same before me.15 However, this Article I
hope offers the continuing discourse three distinct threads of analysis. First, it provides a
history of race, space and class in New Orleans that demonstrates how tenuous the
process of Americanization was over its embattled development, and how the resulting
mythologies eclipsed a vision of urbanization that seems all but lost now. My aim is to
demonstrate that New Orleans’s urban exceptionalism was lost long before Katrina, but
in whose aftermath its liberal precepts appear worthy of revival. Second, the Article
critiques legal localism as more than a good doctrine with inequity-producing flaws.
Legal localism, I argue, is the modern successor to racial segregation, an instrument
effectively shielded from constitutional attack by the proxy of economic discrimination.16
In particular, the Supreme Court rulings of the 1970s which insulated localism from
attack also contributed to the cultural assertions of color-blind innocence that characterize
contemporary discussions of racial difference. Finally, I argue that the twin goals of
saving cities and investing in the social capital of the concentrated urban poor can only
come about through dedicated reform of our legal rules along the principle of equitable
regionalism. Political and empirical realities now show that this principle is capable of a

15

See, e.g., Richard Briffault, “Our Localism I and II,” [cites], Jerry Frug, [cites], Sheryll Cashin, [cites],
John Dubin [cite], john powell [cites] ; Georgette C. Poindexter, “Towards a Legal Framework for
Regional Distribution of Poverty-Related Problems,” 47 Wash. U. J. Urb. & Contemp. L. 3 (1995); Joan C.
Williams, “The Constitutional Vulnerability of American Local Government: The Politics of City Status in
American Law,” 1986 Wis. L. Rev. 83 (1986). Cf. David Barron, [cite], Richard Ford [cite],
16
I use the term “legal localism” to distinguish the legal constellation of rules, court decisions and
rationales supporting local autonomy from the cultural imagination from which it comes. Localism as an
idea is much larger than legal localism as a set of doctrines, though the idea could not have nearly the
organizational influence in American life without the complicity of the latter. Legal localism, for example,
could have focused primarily on large cities as its prototype, rather than smaller suburban municipalities,
favoring and empowering the former over the latter. Yet that would have contradicted the exclusionary
impulses animating localism.
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workable, though anti-localist, premise: That what is good for the poor is also good for
the middle class.
Part II examines the history of race relations across spatial relationships in New
Orleans, with particular emphasis on how American thinking produced a binary
capitulation—two races, one white, one black—despite the resistance of radical Creoles
of color and substantial barriers to spatial distance imposed by the climate and the
landscape. That history is directly complicit in the vulnerabilities that produced the
continuing disasters for so many after Katrina. This Part concludes with an analysis of
how the late-breaking development of suburbia around New Orleans followed the same
segregated patterns seen elsewhere during the post-war period. Part III asserts that what
segregation started, localism codified and has proved a more formidable guarantor of
middle-class wealth and privilege on the one hand, and concentrated black poverty on the
other. Specifically, this Part examines the jurisprudential edifice fortifying segregation in
the more durable form of race-neutral rules of local autonomy developed by state
legislatures and courts, but ultimately, as I argue, given the Supreme Court’s imprimatur
in a series of illustrative cases decided in the critical decade of the 1970s. These rules
reproduce racial and economic segregation through their interaction with economic
rationalism, decentralization, consumption and political fragmentation as well as black
middle class anitpathy toward integration. Part IV argues that cities cannot expect to
command the resources to provide adequately for the excluded poor or to sustain
economic growth without regional alliances for, among other things, distributing fair
housing obligations and sharing tax revenues. These reforms flow from a principle called
equitable regionalism. Like other regionalist proposals, it is grounded in planning
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principles. These, I propose, should follow a neighborhood, rather than municipality,
model, as demonstrated by some of the experiments currently underway in New Orleans’
rebuilding efforts.

Part II: The History & Reality of New Orleans’ Americanization
New Orleans’ steep social and economic decline before Hurricane Katrina is well
known. Its wrenching poverty, murder rates, failing public schools, political corruption
and hypersegregation17 belied the positive gloss of its “Big Easy” notoriety. Less
remembered, however, is its heritage as one of America’s first great urban centers, which
necessarily includes its formative struggles over racial integration, interethnic
cooperation and the politics of land settlement. This Part examines New Orlean’s
eventual “Americanization”—as the historian Arnold Hirsch and others use the term—in
order to illustrate how a failing city in contemporary terms, failed long ago (in fits and
starts) to be an urban model for the nation. Americanization, as I intend to use it, refers
to two critical phenomena. First, it is the process of binary capitulation by which a
polyglot city of French- and Spanish-identified Creoles, Irish and German immigrant
laborers (and later Italians), and “Yankee” American protestants became “white” while
free and enslaved black people from Africa, various parts of the South as well as Haiti
became identified as “black”—with a significant portion identifying as “Creole” in the
last but continuing memory of original differences. Second, Americanization is the
exploitation of this binary to institutionalize typical American residential patterns,

17

The term “hypersegregation” describes an area in which at least four of five possible measures of
segregation (unevenness, isolation, clustering, centralization and concentration) occur over a particular
threshold. Douglas S. Massey & Nancy A. Denton, American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of
the Underclass, 74-77 (Harvard 1993).
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especially racial segregation, upon a physical landscape that now represents literally the
fatal implications of marginalized spaces.
New Orleans’ reputation for racial integration is sometimes exaggerated relative
to its rapid segregation over the last 50 years. As the following discussion shows,
“blacks” and “whites” lived in much greater proximity to each other in the city for a
longer period of time than in most American cities. In this sense, the struggle to
Americanize into segregated living patterns was completed later than it was for most
hypersegregated cities. What is most instructive here, however, is that the process was a
historical struggle, with multiple forces as engaged in a conflict over the meaning of
racial identity as they were over segregation. Further, New Orleans’ struggles over racial
identification of both its people and its spaces would not likely have been so pronounced
had the unique physical characteristics of its location not demanded density. “America’s
Western Capital” was as much a critical port city as an island, surrounded by the
Mississippi, Lake Ponchartrain, vast swamplands and impassable marshes until late in the
19th century. Its harsh topography necessarily invited density, if not verticality, so that as
the city grew in population both classes and races lived closer to each other in or near the
high ground grid of the Vieux Carre.18 According to some geologists, the area was “a
land between earth and sea—belonging to neither and alternately claimed by both.”19
Americanization as a spatial reality, therefore, would not take its full shape until the
possibility of suburban sprawl transformed the region in the late 1950s, 60s and 70s.

18

Peirce F. Lewis, New Orleans: The Making of an Urban Landscape 20 (2nd Edition 2003).
Id, at 34 quoting the Charles R. Kolb and J.R. Van Lopik, Geology of the Mississippi River Deltaic Plain,
Southeastern Louisiana. 2 vols. Vicksburg, MS: U.S. Army Engineer Waterways Experiment Station,
Technical Report no. 3-483, July, 1958.

19
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“Americanization” I: The White Supremacist Roots of New Orleans’ Geography

A. Antebellum. Antebellum New Orleans was complex and defiant of
generalizations, because so many fixed categories in American racial experience were
routinely subverted by its customs. Despite laws designed to maintain the supremacy of
whiteness in the racial order, even slaves’ acceptance of a subordinated status was
superficial.20 Social, sexual, political and economic connections among whites and
blacks were too varied and frequent.21 Ownership of black slaves by free Negroes is
illustrative. In 1830, 735 Negroes owned 2,351 Negro slaves.22 While the phenomenon
of New Orleans blacks owning slaves is sometimes characterized as part of a FrancoFrench (and lighter-skinned) elite of free creole hegemony over darker-skinned blacks,
many “slaves” were family members who were subsequently manumitted.23 Nor could
the categories of white and black enjoy universal references in a tightly configured city
developed in an efficient grid on the high ground along the Mississippi River. In 1810,
the city’s population was 36.7% white, 28.7% free people of color and 34.6% slaves.24
By 1850, it was 76.9% white, 8.5% free people of color and 14.6% slaves.25 But during
that span, the “white” population had changed many times over as German, Irish, then
Italian laborers entered the port city alongside existing whites of “American,” Spanish
and French origin.26 Serious social antagonisms between the latter two—the old guard
who had given the city its distinctive flavor and the Eastern elites of the country’s
20

John W. Blassingame, Black New Orleans: 1860-1880 9 (University of Chicago Press 1973)
Id.
22
Id. at 11.
23
Id.,at 11: “[S]uch masters entered 501 of the 1,353 manumission petitions in the emancipation court
between 1827 and 1851.”
24
Joseph Logsdon and Caryn Cosse Bell, “The Americanization of Black New Orleans, 1850-1900,” 206 in
Arnold R. Hirsch and Joseph Logsdon, eds., Creole New Orleans: Race and Americanization (Louisiana
State University Press 1992).
25
Id.
26
[source]
21
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westward expansion—fueled the divided shape of the city’s geography as well as its
ultimate identity.27 Yet despite expressions of white supremacy and fear of blacks typical
of many parts of America,28 social admixture prevented racial identity in New Orleans
from adhering to binary categories and instead for both blacks and whites remained
multitudinous.
“Americanization” refers first to the process by which a polyglot city struggling to
incorporate multiple cultural influences discovers and institutionalizes racial segregation.
Segregation—the de jure and de facto forced identification of racialized space—is rooted
in the meanings associated with land and place. “[T]he city’s social history was both
paralleled and influenced by its physical development. If the city’s geography had once
forced New Orleanians into intimate association, physical changes in modern New
Orleans facilitated the drive of white supremacists toward racial segregation and
polarization.”29
This first aspect of Americanization did not occur swiftly or linearly, but by
pendular accretions. During the 1850s, the pendulum swung away from the city’s
integrated traditions and economic opportunities which had attracted ambitious free
“American” blacks, and blacks saw a vanishing of freedoms. In 1852, for example, three
municipalities merged and racial oppression increased.30 It was a period in which many
more “American” whites came to the city.31 The city’s population grew along with the

27

Peirce F. Lewis, New Orleans: The Making of an Urban Landscape, 44-47. There was deep animosity
for the Americans among the Franco-Spanish residents of New Orleans, and the distrust and contempt for
ways and beliefs was mutual. Id. Canal Street came to divide the American sector from the city, and in
1836 New Orleans was divided into three separate municipalities which reflected the political extent of the
conflicts. Id. At 45.
28
Blassingame, Black New Orleans, supra note __ at 16.
29
Hirsch and Logsdon, eds., Creole New Orleans: Race and Americanization , supra note __ at 197.
30
Logsdon and Bell, “The Americanization of Black New Orleans , supra note __ at 208.
31
Id, at 206.
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sources of cultural influence. By 1860, free people of color were only 6.4% of the
population, but their absolute numbers (10,939) were significant.32
Blacks with Franco-Caribbean origins—mostly from Haiti and roughly
identifiable as creole33—often embraced the principles of social equality, full political
rights and liberty reflected in the French and Haitian revolutions.34 Like the founders a
generation before them, creole “radicals” succeeded in passing a state constitution in
1868 that “mandated the integration of all government facilities, including public schools,
and also all private businesses licensed by the state to serve the public.”35 But there was
tremendous and violent backlash by whites and disagreement among blacks about how
far to push against the segregationist tide. By 1866, a year of race riots between whites
and blacks, New Orleans blacks experienced a growing divide.36 This intraracial divide
would remain a critical fulcrum in the contested meanings given to race and space.
Before the civil war, the racial geography of the city—the early foundation for
what would become the second phase of Americanization—showed a patchwork of
blacks throughout. Many blacks lived in the French Quarter. Others lived among the
white households for whom they often worked as domestics, in “small, nuclear clusters”
behind “superblocks” fronted by wealthy boulevard homes.37 The poorest blacks,

32

Id.
See explanatory note at note 49 infra.
34
Logsdon and Bell, “The Americanization of Black New Orleans,” supra note __ at 209.
35
Id. at 241.
36
Id.,. Disagreements over whether to seek universal suffrage were a harbinger of the differences between
DuBois and Washington decades later (or Malcolm and Martin many years later), with some demanding
full equality and others urging caution and self-help. The militants won, however briefly, when blacks in
Louisiana gained suffrage as well as integrated government facilities and public schools. The violence
reported by the creole-led Tribune may have helped passage of the 14th Amendment and the Reconstruction
Acts. “It was, ultimately, a white-black ‘American’ alliance that eclipsed creole eminence and weakened
resistance to a policy of racial separation.” Hirsch and Logsdon, supra note __ at 195.
37
Peirce F. Lewis, New Orleans: The Making of an Urban Landscape, 50-51. According to Lewis, “If
America had to have racial segregation, the New Orleans pattern was less malevolent than that of most
northern cities.” Id.
33
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however, lived in battures or backswamps, poorly drained, unkempt, mosquito-infested
areas near the river.38 Over time, the latter would come to symbolize the more familiar
pattern of residential organization we see today.
B. The Civil War, Reconstruction and Radical Creolism. With the Civil War
came an intensification of racialized emotion. Fear has always been a key ingredient of
racial animus, but after the war humiliation also affected southern whites’ views of
themselves generally and the configuration of a city like New Orleans in particular.
“Humiliated by their defeat in a war in which blacks had marched in the legions of the
victors, southern white men returned from the field of battle to find the Negro in places
which they felt were their own.”39 Calls for violence against blacks grew more frequent,
clashing with the growing desire of blacks across the South to see their new freedoms
expressed in respect for black “manhood”—equal justice, political participation, suffrage,
integrated schools and public facilities and control of their own institutions.40 In New
Orleans, Reconstruction brought many of these things as well as the makings of a white
segregationist backlash designed to humiliate black citizens in turn.41
“Nowhere did Reconstruction begin so early or advance so far in its legal
challenges as in New Orleans.”42 Radical black creole reformers who had lost their
dominance by 1870 were briefly re-ascendant during the period as the racial pendulum
swung again. However, despite the political gains the reformers had helped secure for
blacks in the 1870s, there were discernible tensions among blacks in the city over how far
38

Id., at 51-52.
Blassingame, Black New Orleans, supra note __ at 174.
40
Blassingame, Black New Orleans, supra note __ at 176-77 (Quoting the black New Orleans Tribune,
Jan. 6, 29, 1869: “We wish to be respected and treated as men—not as Africans, or negroes, or colored
people, but as Americans and American citizens.”)
41
Interestingly, Blassingame notes that “[t]he word humiliation appeared more frequently than any other in
Negro catalogues of the impact of segregation on them.” Id., at 179 (fn omitted).
42
Logsdon and Bell, at 216.
39
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to push for full citizenship rights. While the backlash against Reconstruction was
powerful throughout the South, these tensions ironically may have produced a strength in
Louisiana sufficient to hold back the retrenchment longer than elsewhere.43 But it came.
Re-segregation occurred in 1877 and again in the 1879 “Redeemer” constitution.44
Radical creoles of color such as Aristide Mary, Louis A. Martinet and Rodolphe
Desdunes, philosophical forebears of the modern civil rights movement, sought recourse
in the federal courts. In 1890, they formed the American Citizens Equal Rights
Association and brought two lawsuits. The most famous was named for the creole
activist who challenged segregated train cars, Homer Plessy (biologically just 7/8
black).45 That legal defeat was devastating, leading New Orleans to become, “in its race
relations, very similar to other cities in the South.”46
Following Reconstruction, legal segregation would take many forms, particularly
with the late 19th-century rise of Jim Crow, which had profound effects on the social
construction of a racial calculus and its physical manifestations in urban land. Cheryl
Harris has argued that this process significantly contributed to the identification of
property in whiteness.47 This, too, is a feature of what Hirsch called Americanization.
The emerging racial calculus that, by law, devalued even a little black heredity,
submerged ethnicity and for those who were privileged to have one, demanded a choice.
White creoles, for instance, became white. “In an age of racial totalitarianism, the rapid
assimilation of white immigrants and the fierce determination of white creoles to link

43

Id at 249-51.
Id. at 253.
45
Id. at 257. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)
46
Id. Logsdon and Bell, “The Americanization of Black New Orleans” at 259.
47
Cheryl Harris, “Whiteness as Property,” 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1707 (1993).
44
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their identity to a biological rather than cultural heritage sharply demonstrated how
Americanized New Orleans had become.”48
As segregation systematized the conditioning of social and economic benefits in
New Orleans, it not surprisingly revealed the trade in skin color. That is, a system that
creates both property and social relations in biological identity implies markets of trade in
those “values.” The color line in New Orleans had (and has) always reflected a certain
caste system of racial lineage among blacks; the very term “creole” remains charged
today because of its association with lighter-skinned elites.49 Whites and white
institutions encouraged the divisions among blacks. During the antebellum period, most
free negroes were mulatto, while most slaves were black (77% and 74%, respectively, in
1860).50 The former were legally barred from interacting with the latter.51 After
Reconstruction and notwithstanding the fierce advocacy of equal rights by radical creoles
of color, black creoles often sought to gain the status benefits of assimilation that white
creoles chose.52 In the 1875 census, hundreds of Louisiana mulattoes reported

48

Hirsch and Logsdon, eds., Creole New Orleans: Race and Americanization , supra note __ at 190.
Definitions abound, including those limited to time periods. In the eighteenth- and early nineteenth
centuries, many simly defined creole as indigenous to Louisiana or New Orleans, as opposed to born
elsewhere, particularly slaves. Hirsch and Logsdon, Creole New Orleans, supra note __, at xi, n4. There is
evidence that for a while after that, the term was used to describe people of European descent born in the
Americas. Gwendolyn Midlo Hall, “The Formation of Afro-Creole Culture,” in Hirsch and Logdon, eds.,
Creole New Orleans, at 60-61. This all-white usage of the term was especially prevalent during
Reconstruction. Hirsch and Logsdon, Creole New Orleans, at 98. See also Joseph G.Tregle, Jr., “Creoles
and Americans,” in Hirsch and Logdon, eds., Creole New Orleans, at 134, 138-41; Aline St. Julien,
Colored Creole: Color Conflict and Confusion in New Orleans (1987) [on file with author]. However, it is
far from clear how the term came to hold its contemporary connotation of a black person with longstanding
roots in New Orleans and French, Spanish or Haitian lineage.
50
Blassingame, Black New Orleans, supra note __ at 21.
51
Id.
52
Arnold Hirsch, “Simply A Matter of Black and White: The Transformation of Race and Politics in
Twentieth-Century New Orleans,” in Creole New Orleans: Race and Americanization, at 265.
49
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themselves as “white.”53 “In all probability, from 100 to 500 Negroes became ‘white’
every year from 1875 to the 1890s.”54
2.

Americanization II: Technology and Changes to the Land Under Jim
Crow and Formal Land Use Laws

A. Technology. Jim Crow and the separate but equal doctrine upheld by the
Supreme Court in Plessy v. Ferguson demonstrated the role of law in facilitating the
creation of a post-civil war racial marketplace. Law codified the hegemony of American
race perceptions—white supremacy—and institutionalized the racial choices available to
whites or to those blacks who could stake some property-like claim in their origins. For
the latter, this was increasingly difficult to do. The American racial calculus was
deliberately narrow and simple—the white-black binary. Even after Plessy the legal
status of partial black identity was nebulous, though its social significance was clear.55

53

Blassingame, Black New Orleans, supra note __ at 201.
Id.
55
See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896)(“It is true that the question of the proportion of colored
blood necessary to constitute a colored person . . . is one upon which there is a difference of opinion in the
different states . . . . But these are questions to be determined under the laws of each state, and are not
properly put in issue in this case. Under the allegations of his petition, it may undoubtedly become a
question of importance whether, under the laws of Louisiana, the petitioner belongs to the white or colored
race.”); see also, Charles A. Lofgren, The Plessy Case, 153 (Oxford University Press 1987)(“Determination
of race was wholly impossible to be made . . . by any tribunal, much less by the conductor of a train . . . . In
addition, neither federal nor Louisiana law had defined the limits of race [and] . . . . under the Louisiana
separate car law the determination depended on the conductor’s arbitrary judgment.”(quotations omitted)).
“Louisiana did not statutorily define Blackness [but] did adopt via its Supreme Court an
‘appreciable mixture of negro blood’ standard.” Christine B. Hickman THE DEVIL AND THE ONE
DROP RULE: RACIAL CATEGORIES, AFRICAN AMERICANS, AND THE U.S. CENSUS, 95 Mich.
L. Rev. 1161, fn72 (March 1997); Lee v. N.O. & Great Northern Railroad Co., 125 La. 236
(1910)(suggesting that ‘persons of color’ included persons with as little as one sixteenth African ancestry.)
Amy Leigh Wilson, A UNIFYING ANTHEM OR PATH TO DEGRADATION?: THE JAZZ
INFLUENCE IN AMERICAN PROPERTY LAW, 55 Ala. L. Rev. 425, fn2 (Winter 2004)(citing Ted
Gioia, The History of Jazz at 34 (1997). (Stating, “[t]he Louisiana Legislative Code of 1894 was a decisive
turning point for black Creoles, as it designated that anyone of African ancestry was a Negro.” ) Daniel J.
Sharfstein, THE SECRET HISTORY OF RACE IN THE UNITED STATES, 112 Yale LJ 1473, 1507
(April 2003) (“After the Louisiana Supreme Court ruled that anyone of traceable African origin was
"colored," that state's Bureau of Vital Statistics assumed an equally powerful role in maintaining the racial
order.”) Orville Lee, LEGAL WEAPONS FOR THE WEAK? DEMOCRATIZING THE FORCE OF
WORDS IN AN UNCIVIL SOCIETY, Law & Soc. Inquiry 847, (Fall 2001)(citing Virginia Domínguez,
White by Definition: Social Classification in Creole Louisiana, New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University
54

http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art44

Katrina’s Window

TROUTT

Page 17

To be white under segregation meant, of course, to have at least some choices about the
exercise of one’s trade value; to be black meant to have few to none. (This remains the
case, as the discussion of Hurricane Katrina, infra, demonstrates.) Because of
technological changes, those choices greatly expanded for New Orleans whites by the
turn of the century.
Pumps allowed the landscape to expand beyond the edges of the Mississippi.
First legislated in 1899, the city installed pumps which within a decade radically
transformed the livable environment by draining large sections of swampland near Lake
Ponchartrain.56 Canals soon followed. In the 1920s, the Orleans Levee District helped
stimulate a building boom and a northern population shift by securing two thousand acres
of waterfront real estate.57 The combination of high costs and de jure discrimination
ensured that these newly developed areas were occupied by whites. Black population
expansion occurred in the floodplain.58 These events in the physical and racial
configuration of the city reflected law. Louisiana passed a statute in 1924 empowering
cities of 25,000 people or more to impose residential segregation; it took the New
Orleans city council a full week to comply.59 Equally important at the time was white
(Democrats’) successful efforts to disenfranchise all black voters through the use of white
primaries, poll taxes, literacy tests and the “understanding clause.”60
B. The Intersection of Jim Crow, Rational Planning and Localism. The
1920s was also a critical decade in the advent of formal urban planning tools, especially
Press (1986))(referring to “a 1970 Louisiana statute that made 1/32 'Negro blood' the dividing line between
white and black.” )
56
Hirsch and Logsdon, eds., Creole New Orleans: Race and Americanization , supra note __ at 198. [Add
Colten’s more thorough analysis here]
57
Id., at 199.
58
Id.
59
A. Hirsch, “A Matter of Black and White,” supra note __, at 268. [CITE TO ACT or infra].
60
Id. [EXPAND & DEFINE?]
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after exercise of the police power was upheld by the Supreme Court in Euclid v. Ambler
Realty.61 In 1918, the state of Louisiana passed Act 27, which roughly inaugurated land
use planning—the segregation of certain kinds of (business) buildings from (residential)
buildings—for municipalities of more than 50,000.62 Like many cities, New Orleans
parish followed the lead of the State Zoning Enabling Act (SZEA) which was drafted by
the federal Department of Commerce, and adopted the first comprehensive zoning
ordinance in 1929.63 (The state enabling act, which allowed municipalities to create land
use plans at their option, was not passed until 1946.)
There is nothing particularly novel about the land use regulation adopted by either
the state of Louisiana or the city of New Orleans. Louisiana’s enabling act does not
mandate a municipality adopt a master plan. Instead it gives each municipality the
authority to create a planning commission, and such commission can adopt its own
comprehensive plan.64 Furthermore, even where a plan is adopted, “developers need only
the blessing from the City Council to override the guidelines.”65 None of it is
mandatory. Interjurisdictional cooperation is not required in any meaningful way. It
provides generally for the orderly exclusion of incompatible uses within municipalities.

61

272 U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct. 114, 71 L.Ed. 303 (1926).
Villavaso, Stephen A., Planning Enabling Legislation in Louisiana: A Retrospective Analysis, 45 Loy.
L. Rev. 655, 656 (1999).
63
See City Archives New Orleans Public Library, Historical Note, http://nutrias.org/inv/zone1929.htm,
which is frequently amended and hard to locate. An attempt in 2001 to revise the CZO was never adopted
(see New Orleans Land Use Plan, April 1999, at
http://secure.cityofno.com/Portals/cpc/Land%20Use%20Plan/Land%20Use%20Plan (text%20only).pdf.
64
See generally, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 33:101
65
Brett Clanton, “New Orleans City Council moves forward with zoning ordinance revision,” New Orleans
City Business (May 27, 2002) available at,
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4200/is_20020527/ai_n10172437.
62
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Most importantly, it expresses the regulatory architecture of localism, which has
remained normative ever since.66
What is interesting to note, however, is that formal rational planning devices
(which would remain good law today) would operate alongside and correspond to Jim
Crow segregation laws (which would not). New Orleans was among many cities that
engaged in a variety of racial zoning attempts before most were struck down by the
Supreme Court in Buchanan v. Warley.67 For instance, as C. Vann Woodward wrote in
The Strange Career of Jim Crow, the city “developed a law requiring a person of either
race to secure consent of the majority of persons living in an area before establishing a
residence therein.”68 Frustration with the Court’s ruling would embolden other devices

66

The planning process in New Orleans, even before Katrina, has received substantial criticism, primarily
due to the lack of force behind zoning guidelines. Id. In 2002, critics argued over what should come first:
a new city master plan or new comprehensive zoning ordinances. Id. Many questioned “the value of
revising zoning laws when developers need only the blessing from the City Council to override the
guidelines.” Id.
Right after Katrina various groups, including the Urban Planning Committee of the Bring New
Orleans Back Commission, suggested New Orleans adopt a new Master Plan and “give it the force of law
through a charter change.” Bring New Orleans Back Commission
Urban Planning Committee, Power Point Presentation “Action Plan for New Orleans: The New American
City,” 55 (January 11, 2006)(power point presentation). Similarly, other groups, like the Bureau of
Governmental Research, suggested that an effective approach would be to “limit the City Council's role in
land-use decisions,” and give “the City Planning Commission and the Board of Zoning Adjustments . . .
greater authority.” Bruce Eggler, “N.O. urged to revamp land-use policies; Council has too much power,
nonprofit says,” Times-Picayune (August 4, 2006) available at,
http://bgr.org/BGR%20in%20the%20News/N.O._urged_to_revamp_land-use_policies_TP080406.pdf.
This, coupled with a change in “how members of the two bodies are appointed to try to make them more
professional and nonpolitical,” id., would give neighborhoods a greater voice in the post-Katrina rebuilding
process. The Bureau published these recommendations in a report called, ‘Planning For a New Era:
Proposed Changes for Land Use Decision Making in New Orleans,’ see posting of Seymour D. Fair to The
Third Battle of New Orleans, http://thethirdbattleofneworleans.blogspot.com/2006/08/bureau-ofgovernmental-research.html (August 4, 2006, 14:37) (for a link to the report), and “[m]any of [these]
changes . . . [were] designed to give greater legal force to the master plan for the city's physical
development.” Id.; see also, Stephen D. Villavaso, “Growth Management: How Communities
Grow/Change/Redevelop In A Post-Katrina And Post-Kelo World,” podcast available for purchase at,
http://www.lorman.com/seminars/teleconference.php?product_id=165217&topic=DEV&pod_only=1.
67
245 U.S. 60 (1917)
68
C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow, 100-101 (Oxford, Third Rev’d Edition, 1974).
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that advanced segregation such as racial covenants in leases restricting sales to white
persons.69
3.

“Desegregation” and the Post-War Institutionalization of Marginal Spaces

Segregation intensified after Brown as white Louisianians manufactured ways to
resist the ruling. In particular, the 1950s saw the rise of the White Citizen’s Council. In
1956, the state passed 13 pieces of “hate” legislation; in 1961, it passed 92 such acts in
further resistance to school desegregation.70 New Orleans continued to pass segregation
ordinances such as code of the City of New Orleans § 50-6, which required prisoner work
squads to be “made up wholly of white males or wholly of colored males,”71 and
Ordinance No. 828, which required the segregated operation of local taverns.72
Politically, the mayoral election in 1961 of a candidate openly antagonistic to blacks, Vic
Schiro, led to conflict and more political isolation for blacks.73 Economically, the federal
government’s active collusion with, if not encouragement of, private discrimination
against blacks in housing and mortgage lending criteria after World War II contributed as
much as any factor to the foundations of inequality in New Orleans (and across the
country) that took their tangible form in residential relationships.74
A. White Flight and Sprawl. The second phase of Americanization—the racial
identification of segregated suburban space—occurred later in the New Orleans
69

Id., at 101. In addition, New Orleans Ordinance 8037, Common Council Series (1924), upheld in Tyler
v. Harmon, 158 La. 439, 443-44 (1925), under the authority of Louisiana Act 117 which gave
municipalities the power to enact segregation ordinances, and Louisiana Act 118, which prohibited racial
mixing by neighborhood. The case was subsequently overturned.
70
Hirsch, “Simply a Matter of Black and White,” note __ supra at 281.
71
See Pounds v. Theard, 230 So.2d 861 (La. App. 1970)(where the court declares the ordinance
unconstitutional.)
72
See Pania v. City of New Orleans, 262 F.Supp. 651 (D.C. La. 1967)(where the court declares the
ordinance unconstitutional)
73
Hirsch, supra note ___ at 283-84. For instance, when faced with the threat of integrating swimming
pools, Schiro closed them. Id., at 288.
74
See Troutt Ghettoes Made Easy, supra note ___, at ____ (describing assortment of public subsidies
offered on a discriminatory basis to white borrowers over the first two-thirds of the 20th century); [others] .
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metropolitan area than in many cities,75 mainly because the unforgiving landscape
defeated the economic underpinnings of whiteness-as-valuable-property until highway
and drainage technologies caught up. The city was rapidly abandoned by whites, losing
two-thirds of the white population between 1950 and 2000.76 The exodus would change
the population dynamics of the region, transforming New Orleans from a city that was
45% black in 1970 into one that was 67% black in 2000,77 with an overall population loss
during the same period of 18% or 109,000 people.78 New Orleans’ loss was initially
neighboring Jefferson Parish’s gain. Jefferson became the focal point of middle-class
white flight, even after completion of the causeway that linked New Orleans and St.
Tammany Parish.79 Residents made known their hostility to blacks (and the poor
generally), as much of the early exodus coincided with resistance to school desegregation
orders following Brown.80 The middle-class migration to Jefferson Parish “goes a long
way toward explaining the near absence of a white middle class in New Orleans City.”81
But Jefferson Parish would not be enough to fulfill typical patterns of
Americanization, and its decline would follow the city’s.82 By the late 1960s and 70s,
parts of New Orleans clearly resembled “antimarkets”—sites of racial and economic
negation from white middle-class norms—and fear of crime and school integration fueled

75

Matthew Lassiter describes the process this way: “As the nation at large, which operated under its own
progressive mythology of racial harmony, the politics of moderation in the Sunbelt South attempted to
move beyond the Jim Crow system of legal segregation through the spatial policies of suburban sprawl and
urban containment.” The Silent Majority, supra note __ at 11.
76
Peirce, supra note __ at 125.
77
Brookings, After the Storm, supra note ___ at 9
78
Brookings, After the Storm, supra note ___ at 4.
79
Peirce, supra note __ at 78-80.
80
Id., at 99, 125. According to Peirce, the prevailing attitudes among whites viewed themselves as a
“superior race, and the idea of living next to blacks as equals was unthinkable.” Id.
81
Id., at 138.
82
It now has ghettoes. Id..
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white desires for even greater geographic distance from blacks.83 Sprawl represented
geographic, demographic and economic trends. The causeways and bridges over Lake
Ponchartrain and the addition of a completed Interstate 10 (following Huey Long’s
“Airline Highway”) had by now shortened commutes to more distant parishes in the
seven-parish New Orleans metropolitan area.84 By 2000, a majority of the metropolitan
population lived outside New Orleans; Jefferson Parish’s population was nearly equal to
the city, and the population of St. Tammany doubled.85 Sprawl accompanied economic
growth at the expense of the city as well. Between 1970 and 2000, New Orleans had
only 42 percent of the area’s jobs while employment growth ballooned in the suburbs,
especially St. Tammany.86 Nevertheless, the region “de-densified”—i.e., its population
per acre actually decreased by 21 percent.87 For most of the region’s whites, therefore,
sprawl offered newer homes88 and shorter commutes89 on (usually) higher ground.
Black suburbanization took on a very different cast despite the growth in the late
1970s and 1980s of a significant black middle class. Its suburbanization increased only
in the older suburb of Jefferson Parish (to 23% of the population in 2000), yet remained
low in the other suburban parishes of the region and significantly declined in the parish of

83

Id., at 127-28. The term “antimarkets” is discussed in more detail at ____ infra.
Id., at 139. In addition to Orleans (the city), Jefferson and St. Tammany, there are St. Bernard,
Plaquemines, St. Charles and St. John the Baptist.
85
Brookings, After the Storm, supra note __ at 9.
86
Brookings, After the Storm, supra note __ at 9. For instance, St. Tammany’s gain in its employment base
was 431% over the period, Jefferson 157% and St. Charles 148%.
87
Id., at 11. In fact, densities remained constant in the city over thirty years as the consumption of metro
area land continued to defy natural barriers. “Between 1982 and 1997, the metropolitan area lost 1.4
percent of its population. But during the same period, the number of new square miles of urbanized land
grew 25 percent[.]” Id., at 10.
88
According to the 2000 Census, the median age of homes in the six suburban parishes is fairly recent:
Jefferson 1971, St. Bernard 1972, Plaquemines 1975, St. Charles 1978, St. John the Baptist 1979, and St.
Tammany 1983. Census Summary File 3 (SF3), H035001.
89
Over half of all workers over the age of 16 who did not work at home in the six suburban parishes
traveled less than 30 minutes to work in 2000. Census Summary File 3 (SF 3), P032001 and P032002.
84
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greatest economic opportunity, St. Tammany (from 18 to 10%).90 Middle-class blacks
benefited from an irony of sprawl when a huge subdivision planned for within the city’s
borders called “New Orleans East” went bankrupt in the 1980s following the oil bust.91
The former swampland along Interstate 10 was sold to many families eager to flee urban
chaos for suburban order at affordable prices and became “the only major middle-class
black suburb in the whole metropolitan area.”92 The tragedy of that irony today is that
Katrina’s storm surges over Lake Ponchartrain inundated nearly all of New Orleans East.
B. Public Housing. Just as the dual processes of Americanization overcame
New Orleanians’ unique defiance of binary racial identities and fully segregated spaces,
the city’s experience with public housing eventually defied the best early expectations of
the federal program and degenerated into ghettoization. New Orleans, after all, was one
of the first cities to build public housing after the 1937 Act.93 Though segregated by race,
the first projects would reflect for whites the reformers’ wishes for upward mobility
through transitional, but dignified spaces.94 Indeed, the failure of public housing for
blacks in New Orleans is a microcosm of the failure of the social contract in the United
States. As Martha Mahoney points out in her case study of the projects created by the
Housing Authority of New Orleans (HANO), what worked for most white residents of
public housing immediately after World War II—affordable housing without social
stigma, total geographical isolation or class overconcentration and the establishment of a
way station to economic opportunities in a promising private housing market—was
90

Id., at 10.
Peirce, supra note __ at 80-81.
92
Id.
93
42 U.S.C. 1437 et seq. The first was Iberville, which supplanted the notorious “Storyville” red light
district beside the French Quarter. Peirce, at 132.
94
Martha Mahoney, “Law and Racial Geography: Public Housing and the Economy in New Orleans,” 42
Stan. L. Rev. 1251, 1283 (1990)(“Whites seem to have treated the segregated projects as a step en route to
the private market, or as a cushion to financial setbacks.”)
91
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deliberately withheld from black residents of the city.95 Thus, the subversion of housing
goals by HANO’s segregated policies interacted with widespread private economic
discrimination to deprive blacks of the privileges of a generous citizenship enjoyed by
whites.
At least two key factors characterize the dual trajectories of whites and blacks in
public housing. First, while black turnover rates were low in the projects, high white
turnover rates generally reflected the greater array of private housing opportunities and
jobs available in the post-war local economy.96 In many instances, whites who expressed
satisfaction with their HANO apartments simply could not pass up the offer of affordable
mortgages for housing in segregated and increasingly suburban neighborhoods.97 Such
loans were not offered to blacks, who increasingly doubled up in public housing as
private markets in the city became less affordable.98
Second, while blacks in public housing got poorer and whites moved out, HANO
built new housing projects closer to each other or expanded existing ones.99 As
neighborhoods declined, discriminatory lending policies that trapped blacks (specifically,
redlining and other forms of disinvestment) prevented them from markedly improving
their communities. In this way, HANO’s siting practices must be viewed as another
dimension of the city’s Americanization, since it departs radically from the history of
more heterogenous neighborhood organization. HANO, together with the relocation of
white, middle-class households and jobs to the suburbs, was deliberately segregating

95

Id., at 1253.
Id., at 1282.
97
Id., at 1275.
98
Id., at 1276.
99
Id., at 1284.
96
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interests and making ghettoes. New Orleans had no majority-black neighborhoods until
1976;100 yet by that time, public housing was almost entirely black.101
Public housing, as we will see in the next section, is now “raced.” That is, it is
identified less with the failure of governmental policies or democratically enforced
prejudices and more with the poor black residents concentrated within the projects. The
character aspects of these identifications necessarily combine an abstract individual’s
race and her class because, from the distance of segregated perception, they cannot be
told apart. Beyond racism, the associations between persistently poor black populations
and drugs, crime, gangs and antisocial conduct run so deep as to render “projects” the
prototypical undesirable land use for middle-class Americans—of any race. The project
becomes much like the person to be avoided, as antithetical to the self. This may explain
some of the public’s “Katrina fatigue” despite popular exhortations in the storm’s
aftermath to engage difficult subjects of race and class.102 Yet it is the institutional
origins of these identifications in places like New Orleans which should concern us here.
Because they represent a fundamental flaw in our social contract which increasingly
reveals the mythology of middle-class stability.
C. Ghettoization and Antimarkets. Meanwhile, New Orleans became a case
study in inner-city American poverty. Scholars of poverty in the United States recognize
a distinction between poverty generally and ghetto poverty. Poverty generally affects
millions of Americans for a variety of reasons and for different periods of time. It may or
may not be directly traceable to structural factors in the economy or institutional practices
100

Brookings, After the Storm, supra note __ at 6 (citing the historian Daphne Spain).
Peirce, supra note __ at 133.
102
There is perhaps no better example of at least official disinterest in continuing discussions of race, class
and Katrina than President Bush’s omission of any mention to the disaster in his State of the Union address
seventeen months after the storm.
101
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such as racism. There are two important facts about poverty generally in the United
States: Most poor people are white, and most of the white poor cannot be defined by
spatial characteristics.103 The white poor live among moderate-income and middleincome people, rather than in isolation, and they typically share the local resources and
amenities of non-poor communities. In the New Orleans metro area, only 11% of poor
whites lived in areas of concentrated poverty in 2000.104 (Forty-three percent of the black
poor did.)105
Ghetto poverty, on the other hand, is defined in racial, economic and spatial
terms. Overwhelmingly, it describes black and to a lesser extent Latino poverty. Ghetto
poverty is more clearly reflective of structural factors such as race discrimination in
employment, segregation in housing106 and structural changes in employment and
wages.107 It is geographically concentrated, increasingly isolated from the non-poor and
can be measured in census tracts. Its socioeconomic dynamics are traceable in
institutional patterns, such as educational performance, serious crime and involvement
with the criminal justice system and public welfare institutions. Invariably, ghetto
poverty is a phenomenon rooted in cities and is therefore the focus of the poverty
discussed here.
These definitions require one further step. I refer to persistently poor, ghetto
neighborhoods as “antimarkets.”108 Antimarkets is a term of relation and posits that
ghettos must be viewed in geographic as well as socioeconomic and historical

103

[Jargowsky, Sherriden, M&D] See further discussion infra at page ___.
Brookings Institution, After the Storm, supra note __ at 7.
105
Id.
106
See, e.g., Massey & Denton, American Apartheid, supra note __ at 18-19.
107
See William Julius Wilson, The Truly Disadvantaged, supra note __ at 3-50.
108
Troutt, “Ghettoes Made Easy,” supra note __,.
104
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comparison to the middle-income areas around them. Antimarkets are measurable sites
of economic and political negation over time, where consumer infrastructures fail to
provide basic public and private goods and services to community members; citizens are
disproportionately governed by public law systems that often regulate their privacy;
public health is secondary; educational systems are reflective of scarce resources and
chronically underperform; and severe economic instability is common among
households. Moreover, antimarkets must always be viewed relative to middle-income
areas nearby, like a racial counterfactual, since one is typically the anti-Norm of the
other. For example, antimarkets enjoy few of localism’s protective zoning devices that
support the needs of families with school-age children.109 Transiency is common,
homeownership is tenuous, and participatory democracy is rare. Everything costs
more.110 Drugs and joblessness are the antecedents to a great many bad outcomes.111
Antimarkets are frequently despised by the residents of middle-class communities who,
ironically, often depend on them to shoulder the burden of environmental uses most
would not tolerate in their backyards.112
109

See Jon. Dubin, “From Junkyards to Gentrification,” supra note __ (arguing that low-income black
communities have been historically denied the ‘protective zoning’ devices that supported economically
stable neighborhoods).
110
See David D. Troutt, The Poor Pay More (Consumers Union Publications 1994)(a study of consumer
disparities between low- and middle-income neighborhoods in Oakland and Los Angeleles, CA).
111
See William Julius Wilson, The Truly Disadvantaged, supra note ___.
112
New Orleans is a prime example of this. In general, the environmental issues that affect the Gulf Coast
region, are very different from those affecting the rest of the country. Cities like New Orleans are located
near companies that “manufacture a range of products including fertilizers, gasoline, paints, and plastics . . .
.” Manuel Pastor, et. al., In the Wake of the Storm: Environment, Disaster, and Race After Katrina, 1, 3
Russel Sage Foundation, NY 2006. The proximity to such pollution-generating factories, and the fact that
much of Louisiana’s drinking water comes from underground aquifers susceptible to contamination from
polluting industries, creates a general vulnerability to environmental threats. However, much of New
Orleans’ vulnerability can also be attributed to the “history of . . . white resistance [that] has affected both
race relations and the region’s ecology.” Id. Because the South has often been a “sort of dump for the rest
of the nation’s toxic waste,” id., states like Louisiana have become a breeding ground for environmental
hazards, and such hazards tend to disproportionately affect communities of color. Id.
For years, the government has encouraged the growth of the petrochemical industry through
“wartime federal investment . . . . [and] [t]ax exemptions for plant construction and expansion. . . .” Craig
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This contempt for the Other in antimarkets is both reflexive and reflective, and
comes about in part because of the little acknowledged interdependency between
antimarkets and middle-class areas (called “metamarkets,” in my earlier work). It is
reflexive in its automatism—even the sympathetic middle class are quick to deny a
connection between the plight of the ghetto poor and our own status, let alone
responsibility. It is reflective in the sense of the zero-sum interdependency localism has
promoted. Middle-class resistance to the siting of affordable housing in one’s
neighborhoods, meaningful racial integration, the sharing of environmental burdens
necessary to the region’s businesses and residents, desegregated classrooms, common
employment centers, mass transit—all represent perfectly rational, yet self-maximizing
instincts, as we will see. However, the interdependency should be clear: Where middleclass or metamarket communities reject wealth and resource-sharing with less privileged
people in order to maintain “good ratables,” the neighborhoods where less desirable
people can live—antimarkets—are concentrated with unwanted uses, economically
unstable households and a lack of legal controls protective of individual welfare; in

E. Colten, “The Rusting of the Chemical Corridor,” 47 The Society for the History of Technology (January
2006), available at, http://www.historyoftechnology.org/eTC/v47no1/colten.html Additionally, “[t]he
Louisiana Stream Control Commission issued waste discharge permits with few questions asked during the
1950s and 1960s, particularly along the Mississippi, where the commission turned down only one
application between 1958 and 1966.” Id. This encouragement resulted in continued expansions “which
included massive buyouts by large corporations . . . to build large petrochemical complexes,” and
eventually, the environmental effects could no longer go unnoticed. Pastor at 29.
New Orleans was generally susceptible to environmental health hazards, but certain groups were
particularly vulnerable to the severe effects of the storm. For example, “[n]inety-eight percent of the
residents of the Lower Ninth Ward, the lowest-lying area of New Orleans that was most vulnerable to
flooding, were African Americans.” Pastor at 19. Not only were residents in this area severely impacted by
flooding, but they were likely exposed for longer periods of time, as this is the same population that was
less likely to have access to private transportation. Id. Such long periods of exposure to debris, oil spills,
mold, E. coli in the floodwaters, contaminated soil and sediments, contaminated drinking water, and high
concentrations of lead, arsenic and various carcinogens, are likely to have devastating effects. Id. at 30.
What Katrina did was to reveal some of that environmental racism as well as that topographical inequity.
Yet going forward, the revelation of such dangerous conditions will put greater pressure on housing
markets, allow for fewer safe areas for development, present serious challenges to local density preferences
and therefore may yield little patience for affordable housing.
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current parlance, “bad ratables” necessarily accumulate in areas that are the negation of
“good ratables.” The one cannot exist without the other.113
By the time Hurricane Katrina struck, New Orleans had created multiple
antimarket neighborhoods. In 2000, the city’s overall poverty rate was 28%, only a
couple of percentage points higher than in 1970, but among the highest in the nation.114
Its homicide rate (along with high levels of police corruption and brutality that coincided
with high rates of witness harassment to produce alarmingly low rates of both felony
conviction and incarceration) frequently made it the murder capital of the country.115
However, three brief examples demonstrate the entrenchment of antimarket
characteristics before the storm: poverty concentration, educational dysfunction and the
repudiation of public housing on behalf of low-income households.
First, black poverty in the city concentrated over time into “extreme poverty
tracts” (e.g., census tracts in which at least 40% of the households had incomes below the
poverty line), mainly in parts of the city that were most at risk in the event of a hurricane
or flood. In 2000, 50,000 poor residents lived in 47 extreme poverty tracts. All of these
were predominantly black.116 By contrast and extremes of inequality, wealthy
neighborhoods like the Garden District were 85% white.117 Unemployment rates were
also telling. The Lower Ninth Ward for example, where 85% of the population was

113

A similar kind of interdependency has come to characterize different types of suburbs within a state, as
well as more affluent suburbs and central cities, as discussed further in Part III supra.
114
Brookings Institution, After the Storm, supra note __ at __.
115
See, e.g., Adam Nossiter and Christopher Drew, “Dysfunction Fuels Cycle of Killing in New Orleans,”
NYT A1, 2/5/07, reporting on the record murders since Katrina that once again make N.O. the most violent
city in the country. Most of the crime is black-on-black, drug-related killing in which suspects are rarely
apprehended or charged. Low arrest and conviction rates are variously blamed on anti-snitching fears
induced by frequent retribution on witnesses who cooperate, lax judges, low-paid prosecutors, and a long
history of corrupt, abusive police practices in poor neighborhoods.
116
Brookings Institution, After the Storm, supra note ___ at 6.
117
Id.
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black, had a fourteen percent unemployment rate.118 Over all, in neighborhoods where
90% of residents were black, the unemployment rate was twenty percent.119 In sharp
contrast, predominantly white neighborhoods like Gentilly, the Read Boulevard East, and
the French Quarter had unemployment rates below five percent.120 Furthermore,
approximately 9% of white children under the age of 18 were in poverty in the New
Orleans metro area, compared to over 44% of black children under eighteen in poverty.121
Second, the New Orleans public schools were so abysmal that they went into state
receivorship in 2000, and FBI offices were established on school grounds to root out
corruption.122 Public education suffered in southern Louisiana, according to Peirce,
partially as a result of the variety of private schools developed first by Catholics seeking
parochial education and followed by wealthy Protestants.123 Like much of the South,
New Orleans had never seriously provided educational resources for blacks, which reorganized in the white flight after Brown and contributed to high rates of illiteracy among
black parents and a general lack of experience with formal learning among older
generations.124 The city’s poor public educational system is frequently mentioned as a
factor in its competitiveness relative to rival cities in the region and throughout the
South.125
118

John R. Logan, The Impact of Katrina: Race and Class in Storm-Damaged Neighborhoods, 13 Brown
University, available at, http://www.s4.brown.edu/Katrina/report.pdf (last visited May 1, 2007)
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
Metropolitan Quality of Life, Table: ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES: Child Poverty Rate by
Race/Ethnicity, available at, http://diversitydata.sph.harvard.edu/profiles.jsp?ma=5560 (citing U.S. Census
Bureau 2000).
122
[GNODC cites] Peirce, at 131.
123
Id., at 99.
124
Id., at 130.
125
Id., at 131. Peirce further notes that the growing presence of black school children in Jefferson Parish
has triggered white flight from the public schools. Black children outnumbered white in 1999-2000. As
Jefferson becomes more like older suburbs nationally, some believe that St. Tammany Parish is at risk of a
similar decline. Peirce, at 131, note 14.
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Finally, the failures of public housing in New Orleans have been the target of
reform efforts which respond in theory to agency mismanagement issues and necessary
mixed-income development, but in practice risk eliminating affordable housing options
for the city’s poor. In the face of widespread evidence of corruption and ineffectiveness,
the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) assumed
supervision over HANO in 200_.126 HUD has tried to advance poverty deconcentration
policies through Hope IV mixed-use developments. The problem is that, like many such
initiatives across the country, demolition has far outpaced the construction of affordable
new housing, and former public housing tenants are displaced to an inadequate market of
housing vouchers.
Demolition of the St. Thomas housing project in 2000 is a fitting example. Built
in 1941, St. Thomas contained 1,500 units on 64 acres of prime land in the Uptown
neighborhood.127 HUD and HANO permitted a redevelopment project on the site that

126

[cite and briefly explain circumstances]
Peirce, at 134-36., see also, Coliseum Square Ass'n, Inc. v. Jackson, 465 F.3d 215 (5th Cir. 2006)(for a
brief history of the St. Thomas project: “By 1994, St. Thomas had become excessively run-down and
crime-ridden. The Housing Authority of New Orleans initiated renewal efforts, which resulted in a plan to
renovate the area covered by St. Thomas. In 1996, HUD granted the Housing Authority of New Orleans
$25 million through the HOPE IV program for revitalizing St. Thomas . . . . [b]ecause of its grant of federal
funds, HUD became responsible for ensuring that its financing of the revitalization project complies with
the requirements of NEPA and NHPA. In 1998, HANO enlisted a private developer . . . to assist in
improving the plan . . . . By September 2000, HUD completed the initial Section 106 review required by
the National Historic Preservation Act (“NHPA”). . . . Subsequently, the Housing Authority of New
Orleans, the State Historical Preservation Officer, and the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation (a
federal agency) signed a Memorandum of Agreement (“MOA”) for the project. Demolition began in
October 2000 . . . . On September 4, 2001, after HRI publicly announced that Wal-Mart would be filling the
retail space, the State Historic Preservation Officer asked to reopen the NHPA review . . . . [I]nvestigation
included consultation with . . . the City of New Orleans and its planning commission, the State of
Louisiana, the general public (including St. Thomas residents), and the project's opponents (including
neighborhood groups and preservation agencies).” Id. 227-28. In July of 2002 plaintiffs (on behalf of the
citizens of New Orleans) seeking to compel HUD to withhold funding for the project and arguing HUD did
not comply with the National project did not comply with National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and
the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA). Plaintiffs also argued that certain zoning changes
negatively impacted the environment, and that the project was only in compliance with the local zoning
ordinance after the change in the local zoning laws. But the court held that proving there was a change in
the zoning laws, was insufficient proof of the project’s alleged significant impact on the human
127
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would consist of a total of 1,142 units, most of them luxury condos and market-rate
apartments, with only 337 low-income units.128 Further, the applicable zoning ordinance
was amended to allow for the addition of a “big box” retailer (Wal-Mart). 129 The
proposed project galvanized opposition from local community groups representing
tenants as well as smart growth advocates and preservationists critical of the land use
decisionmaking process. Litigation ensued, but the project was built.130 The fears of
gentrification and displacement among former public housing tenants were confirmed,
and the experience fomented deep distrust for HUD and future Hope IV projects in New
Orleans.
Since the storm a number of factors including the slow pace of recovery have
converged to prevent large numbers of the city’s poorest residents from returning, HUD
has sought a wholesale elimination of many New Orleans housing projects in favor of
mixed-income development,131 and a wave of decentralization is affecting public
education there in a movement toward charter schools.132

environment. The court also struck down plaintiffs argument that the project imposed an unfair and highly
controversial tax increase on the residents.)
128
Id.
129
Interview with New Orleans land use lawyer William Borah, December 12, 2006.
130
See Coliseum Square Ass'n, Inc. v. Jackson, 465 F.3d 215 (5th Cir. 2006)(where the court adhered to the
strict standard that required plaintiffs, which in this case were community organizations representing the
citizens of New Orleans, to show HUD acted ‘arbirarily’ or ‘capriciously’. The court was very deferential
to HUD’s determinations and in reviewing HUD’s consideration of environmental justice issues, found
there was “no administrative insensitivity to racial or economic inequality.”
131
Deborah Cotton, “From the Ground Up: Housing residents take their protest to the French Quarter,”
Katrina Help Center (July 2006) available at,
http://www.thebeehive.org/Templates/HurricaneKatrina/Level3NoFrills.aspx?PageId=1.5369.6532.8587;
see also, Anderson v. Jackson, 2007 WL 458232 (E.D. La., 2007); see also, Richard Wolf, “Some New
Orleans housing may reopen,” USA Today (January 15, 2007), available at,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-12-19-katrina-housing_x.htm
132
See, e.g., Michael Tisserand, “Education Politics Flood New Orleans; As the city struggles to rebuild,
the debate over charter schools heats up,” Utne Reader, March-April 2007, at 10.
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Cumulative Fault Lines Revealed: Hurricane Katrina

As the preceding analysis demonstrates, de jure segregation—the system of
racially identified space—coalesced with formal land use planning to institutionalize de
facto segregation in the city and suburbs of New Orleans, notwithstanding some of the
most considerable early anti-segregation forces in the nation’s history. Although the
actual geographic fault lines changed over time, the basic color scheme did not. Raceneutral land use regulation reproduced the patterns of racial inequality that slavery, Jim
Crow and segregation inscribed. To the present, whites in the New Orleans metropolitan
area have enjoyed unrestricted access to and economic opportunities arising from
appreciating markets of higher, less polluted lands. For poor blacks in public housing or
increasingly concentrated low-ground antimarket neighborhoods, life became routinely
more isolated from the political mainstream, viable neighborhood institutions, economic
opportunity and stability. It also became significantly more dangerous.133
All of this became fatally apparent on August 29th, 2005, when Katrina, a
category 4 hurricane, devastated the city and its compromised system of levees and
canals, producing flooding that killed over 1,800 people, destroyed 200,000 homes and
inundated almost 80% of Orleans Parish.134 Despite the wide swath of destruction and
the inevitability that a great many, moderate- and middle-income Orleanians would be
affected, Hurricane Katrina’s force fell disproportionately on the city’s huge population

133

Hurricane Katrina case study examines how environmental racism-classism and residential segregation
“produce a greater disaster risks for poor, black Americans. . . . Disasters offer a unique realm of analysis
for environmental racism-classism because . . . [they] enable analysis of how individuals are housed in
areas with a pre-existing risk. Race is found to be a strong predictor of flood damage, while class is found
to be unrelated. . . .These results, if accurate, undermine the notion of a race-class nexus for production of
harms.” See Levy, Bayou Blues: The Social Structure of a Disaster: A Case Study of Hurricane Katrina,
Executive Summary (November 9, 2006) available at, http://www.uga.edu/juro/2006/levy.pdf.
134
[recent cite]
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of very poor people.135 Their lack of resources—as well as their overwhelmingly dark
skins—was on international display for several excruciating days of the aftermath, as
they waited in and outside the city’s convention center and Superdome for rescue by
armed national guard. In most cases, one single aspect of their vulnerability made them
visible: They lacked access to a car. Beyond that, many lacked the capacity to stay in
hotels or to travel by public transportation to friends or families elsewhere. In their race,
class status and addresses, they represented for a city and a nation the unimagined
devastation to which people with limited social capital136 are routinely vulnerable.
The relationship between race and poverty associated with the worst of Katrina’s
damage brought rare visibility to the country’s social landscape. Eighty percent of the
households living in flooded areas of the parish were black;137 the average annual income
of those households was $38,000, compared to $55,000 in non-flooded areas.138 The rate
of homeownership in the flooded areas was 53% (though some affected areas, such as the
Lower Ninth Ward, had even higher rates), compared to 69% in non-flooded areas.139
However, renters, whose losses and voices were hardly discussed in most public
135

[cite? Brookings, others]
By a lack of social capital, I refer to the condition of being undereducated, physically and socially
separated from valuable land and from vital economic and information relationships, lacking the leverage
of political organization, poor, connected to the state mostly through compelled relationships with public
institutions, and often at chronic risk of poor health. “. . . social capital refers to features of social
organization, such as networks, norms, and trust, that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual
benefit. Social capital enhances the benefits of investment in physical and human capital.” Robert Putnam,
“The Prosperous Community: Social Capital and Public Life,” The American Prospect, 13 (Spring 1993)
available at, http://xroads.virginia.edu/~hyper/DETOC/assoc/13putn.html, see also, Leonardo Vazquez, “A
Plan For Democratic And Equitable Planning In New Orleans,” Planetizen (November 7, 2005) available
at, http://www.planetizen.com/node/17769 (“Social capital is the network of ties that people have with one
another. It is what makes it possible for people to work together to achieve social change. The social capital
effort would focus on neighborhood quality of life. As residents engage in planning for their own
neighborhoods, they will be better prepared to think about the future growth of their city. Also, by phasing
in growth, the city can better provide services to residents and businesses. This will help attract more
people to the city.”)
137
Brookings Institution, “After the Storm,” 15-17.
138
Id.
139
Id.
136

http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art44

Katrina’s Window

TROUTT

Page 35

conversations about rebuilding or participation in planning, were more than 50% of the
displaced.140 The gaping proportion of renters is not merely a constant among
persistently poor populations—they tend to have low rates of homeownership. It is also a
reflection of the large numbers of public housing residents who were displaced by the
storm, every one of which was black.141 Those projects, we have seen, were primarily
located in “extreme poverty” neighborhoods (i.e., census tracts in which at least 40% of
the households have below-poverty incomes). In 2000, New Orleans had forty-seven
extreme poverty census tracts, and Hurricane Katrina inundated thirty-eight of them.142
These statistics depict structurally engrained economic marginalization, which
follows from the legal, historical and economic antecedents described in the context of
slavery, Reconstruction, Jim Crow and legal segregation. However, the sedimentation of
inequality could not have occurred without physical, racial and economic distance as well
as the legal support to sustain it. Localism, as I argue in the next Part, provided the
jurisprudential edifice that succeeded formal segregation. Together with the ghettoizing
array of discriminatory policies promulgated by the federal government, innumerable
private actors and transformations in the labor economy, the obvious problems presented
by Hurricane Katrina—the problems of persistent, concentrated urban poverty—have
grown much bigger than most cities can overcome on their own.143 Nothing can
effectively overcome the marginalizing effects of segregation and suburban sprawl
140

[source]
Brookings Institution, “Key Inidcators of Entrenched Poverty,” Brookings Metropolitan Policy Program
2005, using U.S. Census and U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development data.
142
Brookings Institution, “After the Storm,”supra note __ at 5, 17.
143
Though it is a discussion worthy of a companion article, there is a great deal more that the city and
parish of New Orleans could do on behalf of its poorest citizens, and, it should. Beyond the many social
capital and in-place community building strategies that have shown promise in other places, this analysis
argues that a more equitable use of regional planning tools is a condition of sustained social and economic
development outcomes. However, as I argue in Part III infra, a precondition of effective equitable
regionalism is public participation in comprehensive planning among city residents.
141
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without the participation of those same predominantly white middle-class communities in
the metropolitan area. Like a great many parts of the country, middle-class households in
New Orleans’ surrounding parishes have benefited economically from their distance from
the poor, particularly blacks. However, there is mounting evidence that those benefits are
ephemeral and—because of the environmental and quality-of-life costs they entail—
limited, especially for those in older suburbs.
This Article will conclude with some specific ideas about local government
reform under a principle of what I call equitable regionalism. However, the preceding
Part’s description of the process of Americanization and segregation is followed in Part
III by an analysis of how segregation gave rise to legal localism, a set of facially neutral
doctrines grounded in city police powers but suited to suburban localities. It is the
resonance of localism with courts and increasingly important suburban political
constituencies that supplants de jure racial segregation.
Part III: Re-segregation, the Supreme Court, Legal Localism and Resistance
Against Interest
1.

Re-segregation and the Creation of Legal Localism

If the begrudging rejection of racial segregation represented an affirmation of the
principles of equality and pluralist democracy articulated by the founders in the late 18th
century and argued by radical Creoles of color in the late 19th century, how could racial
segregation persist in a different guise through the 20th century? Why would the
development of suburbia have to necessitate such a destructive shift in the ability of cities
like New Orleans to sustain middle-class norms and outcomes for so many of their
residents? To be sure, the answers to these questions span several disciplines and social
and economic phenomena. However, I argue in this Part that local government law has
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played a key structural role in fashioning a more durable system of racial and economic
inequality than de jure racial discrimination could. Beginning with the power to zone
(and in many regions of the country to prevent annexation), local governments—
creatures of state power—were given the autonomy necessary to an exclusive existence
outside of the large cities from which most of their more residents originally came.
Emanating from race-neutral principles of rational planning and home rule, the network
of rules governing the powers of suburban municipalities were developed and reinforced
by the courts in ways that defined a lenient role for the state in interlocal conflicts and
asserted state power over localities only occasionally and within narrow notions of shared
regional responsibilities. The result is legal localism, the norm of local governmental
rules today, which closely corresponds to the more general cultural idea of localism,
which characterizes a spectrum of impulses and attitudes about territorial control of
community in the United States. Much of this formation has been covered by other
scholars, particularly Richard Briffault and Sheryll Cashin. Some of it bears review here
in the service of a different analytical emphasis: the connection to preserving racial
segregation and perpetuating its corresponding economic advantages and disadvantages
that fall mainly, but not exclusively, along racial lines. With respect to racial segregation
and concentrated poverty, localism has been characterized in a facilitative, rather than a
causal, light. It is time localism—legal and cultural—be recognized as the primary
agency behind re-segregation, without which it would neither have been accommodated
nor sustained.
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Legal localism defines the relevant localities it governs in a subtle hierarchy, with
suburbs first and cities—especially larger, urban centers—second.144 This structural tilt
represents two foundational aspects of suburban development. First, they were made in
opposition to certain aspects of city life as a refuge for the wealthy away from the
indignities of the largely immigrant poor and the uncouth.145 Suburbs were originally
designed to sustain an exclusive quality of life. As they opened up after World War II,
they were further designed to create an exclusive quality of life for the emergent middle
class. Second, they must be conservative legally and socially in order to preserve status
quo stability against the invasion of destabilizing forces.146 Suburban legal power is
sometimes a tool, but more often a shield used to defend against outsiders.147 Local
control must mean the power to exclude even more than the power to include; indeed, the
attractiveness to employers and residents with high incomes and few public needs (i.e., its
capacity to include) has always been premised on the success of a locality’s efforts to
exclude.148
2.

The Burger Court and Localism’s Jurisprudential Edifice

The character and function of localism took lasting shape under the sanction of
courts precisely during the peak period of white flight from cities, the federal passage of
civil rights laws aimed at frustrating formal segregation, and intense battles over school
busing. Although most legal localism had been developed by state courts, several

144

See Briffault, “Our Localism II,” supra note __, at 373-74; Williams, “The Politics of City Status,” supra
note __, at 119, n190 (“Note that the Supreme Court, like Jefferson himself, has not used the rhetoric of
local control to argue for local control of cities.”).
145
Kenneth Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier, supra note __ at 150-51.
146
Briffault, “Our Localism I,” supra note __, at 70-71.
147
See, e.g., Briffault, “Our Localism II,” supra note __, at 355 (“The core of local legal autonomy is
defensive and preservative[.]”).
148
See Cashin, “Localism, Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of the Favored Quarter,” supra note __, 88 Geo.
L.J. at 1993.

http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art44

Katrina’s Window

TROUTT

Page 39

important Supreme Court decisions demonstrate the way local autonomy would be
balanced against the constitutional arguments advanced by both nineteenth and twentiethcentury civil rights advocates. More importantly, the five cases discussed here—Village
of Belle Terre v. Boraas,149 Warth v. Seldin,150 Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,151 San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez,152 and Milliken v. Bradley,153 —put the Court’s invaluable imprimatur on the
critical aspects of local autonomy.154 Specifically, they solidified the power to exclude
outsiders through zoning ordinances and other land use devices even where such
localized decisions clearly and negatively affected regional housing markets, affirmed the
sanctity of jurisdictional borders within which local powers are exercised, and defended
localities’ presumptive power not only to retain local control of education but of school
finances, even if doing so produced gross fiscal disparities among municipalities.
Surprisingly, legal scholars have paid too little attention to the significance of these cases
decided in the 1970s, the decade that saw not only the suburban resettlement of white
middle-class urban dwellers but also the beginnings of significant economic decline in
the nation’s largest cities.155 Without them, the twin pillars of local autonomy, land use

149

416 U.S. 1, 94 S.Ct. 1536, 39 L.Ed.2d 797 (1974).
422 U.S. 490 (1975).
151
429 U.S. 252 (1977).
152
411 U.S. 1 (1973).
153
418 U.S. 717, 94 S.Ct. 3112, 41 L.Ed.2d 1069 (1974).
154
Arbitrarily limiting consideration to the 1970s, there were others from the Burger Court. See James v.
Valtieri, 422 U.S. 490 (1971)(paren); Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S.
719 (1973)(paren); City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., 426 U.S. 668 (1976)(paren); Rizzo v. Goode,
423 U.S. 362 (1976)(paren). But see Hills v.Gatreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976)(paren); Moore v. East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977)(paren).
155
But see Joan C. Williams, “The Constitutional Vulnerability of Local Government: The Politics of City
Status in American Law,” 1986 Wis. L. Rev. 83 (1986). Williams looked at many of the same Burger
Court cases analyzed here and found a strong Jeffersonian notion underlying the decisions’ sometimes
contradictory support for local sovereignty, especially in upholding exclusionary zoning and local control
over schools. Id., at 111-12.
150
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and school finance, would not have been secure in the jurisprudential edifice succeeding
racial segregation.156
In Belle Terre, the Court resolved a dispute brought by college students in favor
of the town and its right under the police power to zone areas exclusively for families of
related persons. Race was not directly at issue in the case and, had it been, the Court
indicated the ordinance could not survive constitutional scrutiny.157 Instead, the
homeowner and renters believed the village’s ordinance infringed on their constitutional
rights to travel and privacy.158 In affirming the broad police powers of the suburban
locality in the case, the Court referred to precedent from large cities.159 However, in its
assumptions about the need for such expansive power and the ends to which it would
likely be put, Belle Terre is clearly a suburban case. Despite the ostensibly localityneutral language of Douglas’ opinon, the city of New York (the closest large city to the
Long Island suburb of Belle Terre) could not have exercised power in that way. Like
most major cities, it was (and is) too large, too heterogenuous in people and types of
neighborhoods, and has too many kinds of already permissible uses and lifestyles to
156

This analysis differs from an earlier one in which I explore the specific reproduction of middle-class
ideals in Court opinons of that era. See Troutt, “Ghettoes Made Easy,” at ______. The analyses are
complementary since both goes to the formation of an armored suburbia and the courts’ methods of
sanction. However, the analysis here demonstrates how these opinons form a bullwark of legal localism,
which could supplant formal segregation.
157
“If the ordinance segregated one area only for one race, it would immediately be suspect under the
reasoning of Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, where the Court invalidated a city ordinance barring a
black from acquiring real property in a white residential area by reason of an 1866 Act of Congress, 14
Stat. 27, now 42 U. S. C. § 1982, and an 1870 Act, § 17, 16 Stat. 144, now 42 U. S. C. § 1981, both
enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment. 245 U.S., at 78-82.” 416 U.S. at 6 (citation omitted).
The issue had begun to receive some attention from legal commentators, too. See Sager, Tight Little
Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the Indigent, 21 Stan. L. Rev. 767 (1969); Note,
Exclusionary Zoning and Equal Protection, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1645 (1971); Note, The Responsibility of
Local Zoning Authorities to Nonresident Indigents, 23 Stan. L. Rev. 774 (1971).
158
Id.
159
E.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (197_), an urban slum removal case from Washington, D.C., from
which the court quoted as follows: “The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. . . . The
values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the power of
the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as
clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled." Id., at 32-33.
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impose such restrictions.160 Further, the Court’s language locates the (idealized)
environment the village was trying to maintain well outside the “city”:
The regimes of boarding houses, fraternity houses, and the like present urban
problems. More people occupy a given space; more cars rather continuously pass
by; more cars are parked; noise travels with crowds.
A quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor vehicles restricted are
legitimate guidelines in a land-use project addressed to family needs. This goal is
a permissible one within Berman v. Parker, supra. The police power is not
confined to elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy places. It is ample to lay
out zones where family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion
and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people.161
By pitting the Village’s regulation against “urban problems,” the Court situated the
localist power to exclude certain types of residents within the suburbs. The decision,
therefore, belongs among those that establish legal localism on behalf of suburbs in direct
reference to the excluded uses and users common to larger cities. But a racial subtext is
also clear. The power to exclude categories of uses associated with urban problems
unfortunately remains code for black people to this day.162 It is an enormous power,
made greater by its capacity to preclude strict scrutiny, and allows the proliferation of
racial proxies under the guise of rational planning and community self-determination.163

160

Briffault points out that timing also prevents cities from engaging in such regulation in that their spatial
and demographic diversity developed well before the rise of localist legal principles in defining a
municipality’s police powers. Zoning protects parochial interests against future incursions. Ou rLocalism
II, supra note __, at 373-74.
161
Id., at 9 (emphasis supplied).
162
[cites about the use of “urban” in marketing, for example, to signal “black”.]
163
Douglas’ rather famous quote could be modified with the benefit of hindsight to read, “a sanctuary for
[white] people.”
Interestingly, this outcome was explicitly rejected by the Court’s greatest champion of civil rights,
Justice Thurgood Marshall, and utterly ignored by Justice Brennan, both of whom dissented in Belle Terre.
“This is not a case where the Court is being asked to nullify a township's sincere efforts to maintain its
residential character by preventing the operation of rooming houses, fraternity houses, or other commercial
or high-density residental uses. Unquestionably, a town is free to restrict such uses. Moreover, as a general
proposition, I see no constitutional infirmity in a town's limiting the density of use in residential areas by
zoning regulations which do not discriminate on the basis of constitutionally suspect criteria.” 416 U.S. at
17 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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In another zoning case, Warth v. Seldin, plaintiffs were fair housing advocates—
individuals and organizations representing the affordable housing interests of Rochester,
New York’s low- and moderate-income tenants—challenging neighboring Penfield’s
zoning ordinance for excluding people from living in the town on the basis of class
status.164 Again, race was not directly in dispute. Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims were
dismissed by the district court and the Second Circuit on standing grounds, and the
Supreme Court affirmed. The result demonstrates a less obvious dimension of localism’s
conservative power. Not only were the claims based on economic discrimination
rejected, but the dismissal on standing grounds worked the legal procedural equivalent of
the zoning ordinance’s purpose: It defined and excluded outsiders and denied any
regional responsibility a suburb might have for their housing needs. Specifically, the
Court found that nonresidents were entitled to no say in the regional effects, or negative
externalities, associated with one town’s efforts to bar the entry of others. Plaintiffs had
argued, for instance, that Penfield’s exclusions necessarily affected the distribution of
affordable housing opportunities across the relevant metropolitan area, devaluing the City
of Rochester’s housing market and burdening its tax base.165 The majority found these
arguments wholly speculative as to causation, and, in sharply dismissive language,
considered any economic impact on neighboring localities merely “incidental adverse
effects” of the regulation.166

164

The ordinance maintained 98% of the town for single-family detached residences only. 422 U.S. at 495.
422 U.S. at 496.
166
422 U.S. at 509. Quoting precedent, the majority began by saying, “’Of course, pleadings must be
something more than an ingenious academic exercise in the conceivable.’ We think the complaint of the
taxpayer-petitioners is little more than such an exercise. Apart from the conjectural nature of the asserted
injury, the line of causation between Penfield's actions and such injury is not apparent from the complaint.
Whatever may occur in Penfield, the injury complained of -- increases in taxation -- results only from
decisions made by the appropriate Rochester authorities, who are not parties to this case.” Id., at 509
(citation omitted). But see, e.g., N.A.A.C.P. v. City of Kyle, Tex (where Here the NAACP, the Home
165
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In contrast, Arlington Heights actually is a land use case in which race is directly
an issue in dispute. There a low-income housing development corporation was denied a
variance which would have allowed it to build a complex of affordable apartments in a
suburb outside of Chicago. Hearings were held in which opponents of the rezoning made
mixed objections, some based on the “social issue,” most based on an expected drop in
property values.167 The Village rested its denial on grounds of zoning integrity, given the
single-family character of the area, and the expectations of resident homeowners.168
Plaintiffs sued under the then-existing discriminatory effects standard of the Fair Housing
Act,169 but lost before the Court. Using the intent standard it had just announced in
Washington v. Davis,170 the Court acknowledged that minorities might be
disproportionately affected by the lack of affordable housing in Arlington Heights, but
that the decision to deny the rezoning request was based on racially neutral land use
principles.171
Arlington Heights is important to localism in demonstrating 1) its interaction with
contemporary race discrimination standards (specific intent); and 2) the relative immunity
enjoyed by land use decisions with segregative effects so long as a rational planning
rationale is also apparent. The decision was a test case for both sides of the suburban
Builders Association of Greater Austin, Inc. (“HBA”), and National Association of Home Builders, Inc.
(“NAHB”), brought a claim after the City of Kyle adopted changes to its zoning ordinances. The plaintiffs
argued that the changes, which required a minimum garage size, an increase in the minimum home size,
and an increase in the minimum lot size, would cause the average price of a single family residence to
increase by about $38,000. This increase would thus have a disparate impact on African Americans and
Hispanics and would “have a segregative effect on the community.” The court held the disparate impact on
minority communities was a viable injury. The court also held that such injury could be traced to the
zoning ordinances because generally, “more stringent zoning and subdivision ordinances . . . cause[ ] the
price of entry level homes to increase and that . . . price increase has . . . a disproportionate negative effect
on the ability of minorities to purchase starter homes in the City's jurisdiction.”)
167
429 U.S. at 257.
168
Id., at 258.
169
82 Stat. 81, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq.
170
426 U.S. 229 (1976).
171
429 U.S. at 270-71.
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housing integration conflict. Plaintiffs discovered the tremendous difficulty in mounting
a frontal assault on policies with clear racially (and economically) segregative effects.
Defendant-suburban municipalities learned how insulated their land use decisionmaking
could be from constitutional attack so long as a paradigm of categorical land uses (first
articulated in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty172) was scrupulously followed. These
three land use cases provided a localist manual for excluding lower-income residents and
black people generally. Joan Williams has argued that, as a jurisprudential matter, the
Burger Court’s political values followed a Jeffersonian model of local sovereignty and a
hostility toward cities that fit within the demographic conflicts of the era:
By 1970, the intertwined issues of racial and economic discrimination had
become closely linked with the fight between city and suburb. As cities became
poorer and blacker, and suburbs became richer and whiter, housing and school
discrimination issues took on a city/suburb dynamic in many metropolitan areas.
The Court has used the principle of local autonomy to refuse relief for
discrimination in housing or schools whenever such relief requires changes in a
city’s basic metropolitan structure. The Court’s local sovereignty principle
enabled it to eviscerate fourteenth amendment equal protection requirements in
the large number of cases in which discrimination in housing or schools cannot be
remedied without alteration of local boundaries or local duties.173
172

272 U.S. 365 (1926). For instance, Euclid’s language with respect to the ‘parasitic’ effect of apartment
houses resonates today.
With particular reference to apartment houses, it is pointed out that the development of detached
house sections is greatly retarded by the coming of apartment houses, which has sometimes
resulted in destroying the entire section for private house purposes; that in such sections very often
the apartment house is a mere parasite, constructed in order to take advantage of the open spaces
and attractive surroundings created by the residential character of the district. Moreover, the
coming of one apartment house is followed by others, interfering by their height and bulk with the
free circulation of air and monopolizing the rays of the sun which otherwise would fall upon the
smaller homes, and bringing, as their necessary accompaniments, the disturbing noises incident to
increased traffic and business, and the occupation, by means of moving and parked automobiles,
of larger portions of the streets, thus detracting from their safety and depriving children of the
privilege of quiet and open spaces for play, enjoyed by those in more favored localities, -- until,
finally, the residential character of the neighborhood and its desirability as a place of detached
residences are utterly destroyed. Under these circumstances, apartment houses, which in a
different environment would be not only entirely unobjectionable but highly desirable, come very
near to being nuisances. Id. at 394-95

173

Williams, supra note __, 1986 Wis. L. Rev. at 118. See also Briffault, “Our Localism I,” supra note __,
at 30-31, 37-38.
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Two school cases affirmed localism as the nearly exclusive locus of control over
educating children within sacrosanct municipal boundaries.
In Rodriguez, the Court confronted a direct federal equal protection challenge to
the way the majority of states allowed local control of school funding. Plaintiffs were a
class of Mexican-American parents from tax-poor, urban school districts in Texas,
challenging the state’s method of school finance on the ground that its reliance on locally
collected property taxes beyond a baseline of uniform state funding worked substantial
disparities between property-rich and property-poor districts.174 The wide differences in
per-pupil expenditures helped to support smaller class sizes, higher teacher pay and more
experienced teaching.175 The district court had ruled in plaintiffs’ favor, finding that
education was a fundamental right under the Constitution, wealth was a suspect
classification, and any governmental scheme which discriminated in public education on
economic grounds was therefore subject to strict scrutiny.176 The Court reversed on each,
finding no fundamental right to education, denying that wealth was suspect and
upholding the importance of local autonomy over school finance on rational basis
grounds. Mindful of the federalism concerns implicated in the plaintiffs’ challenge,177
the majority characterized the trial evidence as involving murky issues of social and
economic policy outside the Court’s expertise and producing only an allowable and
expected amount of fiscal inequality.178

174

411 U.S. at 4.
411 U.S. at 14, n.35.
176
411 U.S. at 17-18.
177
411 U.S. at 44. “[I]t would be difficult to imagine a case having a greater potential impact on our
federal system than the one now before us, in which we are urged to abrogate systems of financing public
education presently in existence in virtually every State.” Id.
178
411 U.S. at 50-51.
175
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Despite the necessary emphasis on state power relative to federally guarunteed
rights, Rodriguez is squarely a localism decision in its substance and its narrative of local
power. The majority dismissed the fiscal inequality between rich and poor districts as a
hybrid or compromise between local fiscal control and irreproachable state-wide
minimum standards. Instead, the disparities reflected differences in ingenuity and
democratic priorities between localities, primarily matters of choice yielding competitive
diversity. As Justice Powell stated:
[L]ocal control means…the freedom to devote more money to the education of
one’s children. Equally important, however, is the opportunity it offers for
participation in the decision making process that determines how those local tax
dollars will be spent. Each locality is free to tailor local programs to local
needs.179
The argument fully ignored the relative incapacity of tax-poor districts to exercise
such fiscal choices on behalf of their school children, and that, as Justice Marshall
pointed out in a stinging 75-page dissent, the inequality of fiscal resources resulted in
denial of an equal opportunity to learn.180 These concerns, according to the majority’s
narrative were irrelevant to both local control and equal protection in the school finance
context. The Court even foreshadowed the competition for “good ratables” that dictate so
many local governmental decisions to this day:
Nor is local wealth a static quantity. Changes in the level of taxable wealth within
any district may result from any number of events, some of which local residents

179

411 U.S. at 49-50.
411 U.S. at 84 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The Court, he argued, ignored its own education precedent
when, in the desegregation context, it had ruled that unequal resources for black law students amounted to a
denial of equal protection notwithstanding a baseline of law school curricula. Id., (citing Sweatt v. Painter,
339 U.S. 629, 633-634 (1950)). Justice Marshall’s voluminous dissent suggests disagreement among the
justices so bitter as to imply genuine animus as to the meaning of the case. For example, Marshall asserts
that the majority violated basic rules of appellate procedure by allowing the appellants to argue against
facts that had gone unchallenged at trial for the first time at oral argument before the Court. 411 U.S. at 95,
n.56. Further, he argued that the majority’s indifference to fiscal disparities was blind to the line-up of
wealthy school districts who filed amicus curiae briefs on behalf of Texas. Id., at 85 and n.42.
180
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can and do influence. For instance, commercial and industrial enterprises may be
encouraged to locate within a district by various actions – public and private.181
If the blueprint for sprawl and fiscal zoning was not already known to suburban
communities across the United States by then, it now bore the Supreme Court’s seal.
Finally, Milliken v. Bradley affirmed the primacy of local control over education
policy in rejecting an interdistrict remedy for Detroit’s clear record of racial segregation
in its schools. Like Warth, Milliken is one of the few to directly comprehend the regional
scope of institutional racism. The district court found that, given residential patterns at
the time, no intradistrict remedy could achieve desegregated schools within the city and,
because any attempt would probably further identify particular schools (i.e., code them)
as majority black, it would hasten more white flight to the suburban periphery.182 As a
practical matter, only a regional or metropolitan remedy would work.
The majority per Chief Justice Burger disagreed, concerned less about the
probability that serious constitutional violations would go without a meaningful remedy
than with the administrative uncertainty caused by crossing admittedly arbitrary
boundaries.183 Yet the narrative of Milliken is not as emphatic about local control as its
legacy suggests.184 Instead, it is more meaningful as a pronouncement about community
and responsibility, which resonates to this day. After all, Detroit was not always so
black; its white population had been streaming out of the city for years up to and beyond

181

411 U.S. at 54.
418 U.S. at 738-39. Specifically, the trial judge wrote that “while [they] would provide a racial mix
more in keeping with the Black-White proportions of the student population [they] would accentuate the
racial identifiability of the [Detroit] district as a Black school system and would not accomplish
desegregation.” Id.
183
418 U.S. at 741-42.
184
The oft-quoted language is the following: “No single tradition in public education is more deeply rooted
than local control over the operation of schools; local autonomy has long been thought essential both to the
maintenance of community concern and support for public schools and to quality of educational process.”
Id.
182
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1970 when Milliken was first brought.185 Local control of predominantly white school
districts in the suburbs outside of Detroit defined and defended a sense of community for
its residents. Many of them had fled Detroit and therefore rejected membership in that
community. In doing so, those communities and their school districts could not be asked
to assume any of the responsibiity for the segregative policies leading up to that point in
the Detroit schools nor for the effects of such demographic shifts.186 What mattered from
a somewhat formalist constitutional perspective was that those demographic shifts ended
up in nearly all-white districts which did not and could not have engaged in segregation.
An interdistrict remedy would force them to accept blame for Detroit’s past practices,
casting serious doubt on the sanctity of jurisdictional borders.187 In this sense, the
majority’s arguments are familiar to many discussions of legal remedies for past racial
discrimination—colorblindness. The Court’s willingness to use colorblindness to trump
even local control continues in its most recent school desegregation decisions.188

185

See generally Thomas J. Sugrue, The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar
Detroit, 209-229 (Princeton University Press 1996). Detroit, like New Orleans, has a history as one of the
most segregated cities in the United States. Id., at Appendix A.
186
Joan Williams makes a related point about community in the context of Burger Court land use decisions
such as Belle Terre. “The Court’s use of Jeffersonian rhetoric serves to blur the underlying issue of how to
define the ‘community’ entitled to self-determination. Of the myriad possible ‘communities’ available—
from the neighborhood to the nation—the Court chose to focus its solicitude upon predominantly white,
relatively affluent suburbs that were opposing the introduction of low- and moderate-income housing or
other ‘undesirable’ uses.” 1986 Wis. L. Rev. at 112.
187
The use of economic proxies for racial struggles is relevant in another important respect here: it
obscured the extent to which affluent whites benefited from localist rules far more than middle and lower
middle-class whites. The latter could be vociferous antibusing segregationists in part because they were the
whites whose lives were altered by desegregation orders. However, in Charlotte, North Carolina, where
“busing equalization” took hold across the metropolitan area, a coalition of whites and blacks worked
successfully to spread the effects of school desegregation across classes. According to Matthew Lassiter,
“The Charlotte case reveals that the long-term viability of urban school systems undergoing court-ordered
desegregation depended upon spatial and socioeconomic remedies that encompassed the entire
metropolitant region and pursued racial stability through policies sensitive to the demands of class
fairness.” “‘Socioeconomic Integration’ in the Suburbs,” 140 in Kevin Kruse and Thomas Sugrue, eds.,
The New Suburban History (University of Chicago Press 2006).
188
See Parents Involved in Community Schools v. SeattleSchool District No. 1, et al., No. 05-908 (June 28,
2007). In Parents Involved, the Court struck down two voluntary school assignment plans in Seattle,
Washington and Jefferson County, Kentucky on the grounds that their binary classification schemes sought
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Regionalism, especially equitable regionalism, as I later discuss, often risks provoking
defensive reactions about blame for discriminatory conditions.
The doctrines of legal localism illustrated by the previous sample of cases were of
critical utility in institutionalizing a variety of transitions occurring around mid-century.
On the one hand, the fatal contradictions of de jure segregation and the separate-butequal doctrine had been exposed to the world after World War II and was
jurisprudentially untenable. Here, Brown must be seen against the larger context of
federal legislative changes, a burgeoning civil rights movement and, for many whites,
unwelcome cultural confrontations.189 Cities embodied much of the impetus for flight.
On the other hand, the suburbs and a strong economy were expanding along with the role
of the federal government in providing the financial and infrastructural means to a
middle-class ideal for returning veterans. That the benefits of national policy would
accrue on a racially discriminatory basis did not for residents of recipient communities
pose a challenge to their validity. Instead, the changing landscape promoted a 20th
century notion of rugged individualism and the welcome political moderation of
colorblindness.190 Yet the powers of local autonomy that made suburbs safe havens from
the city, the poor, and blacks were always characterized by defensiveness. They were in
many ways untried powers, not on behalf of the very affluent, but for the middle-class,

racial balance in violation of the Equal Protection Clause and the non-racial desegregation dictates of the
Brown case. Although the school districts’ explicit use of race in making assignment decisions compelled
heightened scrutiny, the plurality gave little of deference suggested by earlier cases to the educational
policy decisions made by elected local school officials acting on behalf of the affected local communities.
189
This was especially true for Southern whites. See Sokol, There Goes My Everything, supra note __, at _.
190
Matthew Lassiter describes these sentiments within the terms Richard M. Nixon used to great effect
with voters he called the “Silent Majority.” “The ascendance of color-blind ideology in the metropolitan
South, as in the rest of the nation, depended upon the establishment of structural mechanisms of exclusion
that did not require individual racism by suburban beneficiaries in order to sustain white class privilege and
maintain barriers of disadvantage facing urban minority communities.” The Silent Majority, supra note __
at 4.
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blue-collar ascendants to suburbia who were somewhat unaccustomed to wielding
exclusionary controls. By the 1970s, as we have seen, the controls were tested by myriad
legal attacks. They held. From these decisions, a jurisprudential edifice was erected that
would define insiders from outsiders, draw economic meaning from jurisdictional lines,
empower suburbs against the cities from which they came, and limit their responsibilities
even to their regional neighbors. For the first time, none of it on the basis of race.
Neutral rules then interacted with markets and quickly increased the value of exclusions.
Suburbia’s footing has not been questioned since.
Most importantly, the creation of legal localism effectuated a paradigmatic
alteration of race relationships by substituting economic proxies for race which could
withstand constitutional challenge. Localism is, therefore, a post-war instrument of
economic segregation, and economic segregation is nearly always a post-civil rights
proxy for racial segregation. Today, the doctrines that give mechanical support to these
proxies are settled law. Very little in more contemporary jurisprudence refutes these
principles despite evidence that a great many communities that may have exercised local
autonomy for the paramount purpose of maintaining segregation indeed--three decades
later--succeeded. The same appears to be true of attitudes. Expectations have settled. As
the analysis in the next section shows, the conjoining of legal localism and localist
attitudes around the economic right to exclude reflects the mindset of privatization. Like
private clubs with unfettered rights to make their own rules and determine their own
membership, the sovereignty of local governments to ignore nonresidents—at least where
economic membership is concerned—goes mostly unquestioned.191 Unfortunately, this
idea of sovereignty, without more, facilitates continued segregation. Thus, having
191

Briffault makes a similar observation, “Our Localism II”, supra note __ at 373, n.122.
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explored the creation of legal localism, the analysis turns next to localism as the
successor instrument to the philosophy of segregation in its current residential forms.
3. Legal Localism as the Instrumental Successor to Segregation Today
It is important to acknowledge two corresponding trends since localism was
institutionalized. First, segregation—by race and class—is arguably as pronounced today
as it was when whites began fleeing post-Brown desegregation orders, though some areas
have seen some decrease. For example, the New Orleans metropolitan area ranked as the
fourteenth most segregated region in 2000, with a dissimilarity index of 69 (over 60 is
considered high); that was the same rate in 1990, and only three points below the index
for the New Orleans metro area in 1980.192 Relatedly, the isolation index for New
Orleans metro area blacks, which measures the extent to which blacks live in census
tracts with only other blacks, ranks seventh highest in the nation and has gone roughly
unchanged between 1980 and 2000 at about 70 percent.193 In general, segregation
remains highest where black populations are greatest194—among the larger central cities
in the country195—which also means that the nation’s black population is

192

John R. Logan, Ethnic Diversity Grows, Neighborhood Integration Lags Behind. Lewis Mumford
Center for Comparative Urban and Regional Research. University of Albany, SUNY, available at,
http://mumford.albany.edu/census/WholePop/WPreport/MumfordReport.pdf at 7.
193
Id., at 9.
194
Id., at 4: “Black-white segregation remains very high except in the metropolitan areas with the smallest
black populations. Over twenty years, segregation declined by more than 12 points in metro
areas with less than 5% black population, and by nearly 10 points in areas that are 10-20% black.
But in those areas with 20% or more blacks, the decline was only half that (about 6 points). The
total black population of this latter set of metro areas (20% or more black) is nearly 15 million,
about half the national total. This means that the African American population in the United
States is about equally divided between regions where there has been moderate progress since
1980 and regions where progress is very slender.”
195
The dissimilarity index for Detroit (85), New York (82), Chicago (81), Newark (80), Miami (74),
Philadelphia (72), and Los Angeles (68) shows how large population centers are ranked among the the
twenty most segregated in 2000. Id., at 7.
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disproportionately concentrated in areas with high indices of racial segregation and
isolation.196
Second, the growth of suburban municipalities under localism is tangible
evidence of an “American Dream” for what is now a majority of Americans deemed
middle class. The overall economic success of a municipal form based on increasingly
valuable homeownership and environmental support for family stability cannot be taken
lightly. Not all disdain for large city life, nor attraction to suburban living reflects
structural racism.197 Interwoven markets responding to common consumer preferences
produced a model of sustainable household wealth that is largely efficient, consistent
with democratic beliefs and economically durable.198 Locally responsive land use
regulation and education policies have tangible empowerment effects while also
protecting residential communities from dangerous uses and adverse public health
risks.199 It is also a rational system, based largely on equality of opportunity rather than
overt prejudice, which has produced substantial social and economic benefits for people
of myriad racial and ethnic backgrounds.200 That the legal edifice on which it stands,
localism, systematically justified a constitutive economic segregation of the black poor,
and whose dynamics are complicit in the steady decline of most major American cities,

196

Id., at 11. Blacks are not significantly moving away from segregated areas either. “In 1980 a majority
(53.9%) lived in metro areas where segregation was 75 or above. Those same metro areas still held 51.9%
of African Americans in 1990, and 50.6% in 2000. Thus there was very little net shift away from these
highly segregated areas.: Id. See also Massey & Denton, American Apartheid at 81-82.
197
[Kenneth Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier, on cultural attraction to suburbs historically]
198
[Oliver & Shapiro, White Wealth/Black Wealth, on sources of household wealth]
199
Indeed, it is this function of “protective zoning” that some have argued is missing in low-income urban
neighborhoods, also disproportionately populated by families with school-age children, yet subject to
incompatible uses that undermine consumer infrastructures of basic goods and services, discourage
economic investment and increase poor health outcomes. See Jon Dubin, “From Junkyards to…” [finish
cite]; David D. Troutt, “Ghettoes Made Easy,” supra note ___, at __.
200
[cite on Oliver & Shapiro wealth findings tied to home mortgages; statistics on black suburban wealth
from Urban League, State of Black America annual report]
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has not damned it to its beneficiaries. As the titles of Richard Briffault’s exhaustive
analyses suggest, “Our Localism,”201 it is us. It reflects us, consumes us and, reflexively,
we consume it in a self-sustaining cycle.
Nevertheless, these findings beg two normative questions: Why should specific
commitments to segregation (as only one possible model of exclusion) continue to run so
deep in legal localism? And why should a system capable of producing so many wealthenhancing opportunities remain committed to reproducing the kind of staggering
inequality witnessed in New Orleans? Several reasons reveal themselves: economic
rationalism, decentralization, consumption, political fragmentation, and black middleclass preferences against racial integration.
First, economic segregation appears rational under a system that discriminates on
the objective basis of land use categories, wealth maximization considerations and
parental preferences about child welfare rather than immutable characteristics like race.
As the history of land use and occupancy within the City of New Orleans shows, racial
segregation had always commodified land occupancy according to status categories, for
instance, making poorly drained, hazardous areas less valuable to whites and home to
blacks. Over time, patterns developed there and in cities across the country where
racially and economically disfavored areas became one and the same. The template for a
proxy was well established by the time whites left the city (increasingly a racially
identified space) for the suburbs where the capital structure of development (i.e., the
system of government-financed private mortgage lending, insurance, infrastructure
development, highways, etc.) could ultimately reduce preferences into something as
quantifiable and efficient as a test score: Property values. By most measures, economic
201

Briffault, “Our Localism I,” and “Our Localism II"
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segregation is theoretically good for property values. Thus, patterns originating clearly
along racial rules eventually developed into markets after those rules were rejected, a
transition the Supreme Court (and many state courts) sanctioned under legal localism.
Today, this conclusion is intrinsic to an economic analysis of localism. For
instance, in a recent book William Fischel propounds a political thesis around the
centrality of property values.
The homevoter hypothesis holds that homeowners, who are the most numerous
and politically influential group within most localities, are guided by their concern
for the value of their home to make political decisions that are more efficient than
those that would be made at a higher level of government…[Homeowners]
balance the benefits of local policies against the costs when the policies affect the
value of their homes.202
Furthermore, the history of sprawl tells us that most middle-class homeowners (and their
real estate brokers, lenders and insurers) have traditionally devalued blackness on sight.
And it may never be true that accepting low-income people into a community is
“efficient,” given the near unanimous association between them and declining property
values, higher taxes for public services, crime and underperforming schools. The point is
that economic rationalism supplanted racism as a critical first step in sustaining
segregation under law.
If spatial separations between people, however unequal, are rationally and legally
justified, the resource imbalance created by those relationships will fulfill certain
instrumental cultural prophecies. The first is that, in the absence of overt racial
discrimination in housing, education and employment, something must be inherently
wrong with the segregated poor. Their alarming statistical demise in educational
performance, incarceration rates, unemployment, out-of-wedlock births and welfare
202

The Homevoter Hypothesis: How Home Values Influence Local Government Taxation, School Finance,
and Land Use Policies (Harvard 2005).
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recipiency, etc. was confirmation of inadequacies. On the other hand, in the absence of
overt racism or privilege taking, something must be inherently right about the separated
middle class.203 Its prosperity became emblematic of unequaled American power in the
world, especially after the Cold War ended. This is, of course, a crude contemporary
version of the binary capitulation described earlier as the first step toward New Orleans’
Americanization. Yet it is a necessary sociological complement to the political and legal
developments that created and sustained economic segregation as a fit successor to
segregation. When the resource disparities on either side of the binary are compared, it is
the basis for self-fulfilling prophecies about the dangerous nature of an undeserving black
poor and the pluck and justifiable well-being of a largely white middle class.
A second reason for localism’s succession is decentralization, another train that
could not be stopped. As more localities developed further beyond urban boundary lines
and, resisting annexation,204 began consolidating their legally protected identities,
decentralized government meant localist government. This political fragmentation is in
part a measure of sprawl, but it demonstrates the appeal of local autonomy to define who
belongs and what goes inside one’s borders. With population declining in central cities,
local governments proliferated.205 Rusk uses the example of the nation’s original 168
metropolitan areas. In 1950, 60 percent of the residents of these areas were governed by
203

As some commentators have recently described post-civil rights attitudes about race, “The persistence of
racial disparities…had nothing to do with racism and everything to do with the failure of the racial other to
take full advantage of the unlimited opportunities that were available to all. Whites who benefited from
these structures were not privileged, but innocent people who had earned what they had acquired and,
unlike racial minorities, were deserving of national respect.” john a. powell, et al., “Towards a
Transformative View of Race: The Crisis and Opportunity of Hurricane Katrina” 66, in Hartman and
Squires, eds, There Is No Such Thing As a National Disaster: Race, Class, and Hurricane Katrina
(Routledge 2006).
204
This development was crucial to local government power. See Briffault, “Our Localism I,” supra note
__, at __; David Rusk, Inside Game/Outside Game: Winning Strategies for Saving Urban America 9
(Brookings Institution Press 1999).
205
Id., a 9.
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just 193 city councils, commissions, and mayors or city managers. Forty years later, the
proportion shifted dramatically: 70 percent of the metro area residents were under the
governance of 9,600 suburban municipalities, towns, villages, townships and counties.206
No doubt some of this sprawl represents people moving from one suburb to another—
usually from older to newer—in a pattern of leapfrogging mobility that has long
characterized patterns of suburbanization.207 Indeed, that pattern illustrates the emerging
truth about suburbs: They are far from monolithic or equal. Increasingly (as discussed in
the next Part), the inner-ring or older suburbs, like Jefferson Parish adjacent to Orleans
Parish, have been penetrated by black and other residents of color. Many of these
suburban cities are in economic decline and have become disfavored by many middleclass homeowners. When those who can move to newer localities do so, racial
segregation tends to increase. In this manner, decentralization both reflects and facilitates
segregation by encouraging flight. That is, localism makes it rational while
decentralization makes it possible.208
This leads to a third reason for localism’s succession: Consumption. The
emphasis on property values showed the extent to which housing choices are
commodified. Decentralization revealed the popular proliferation of those choices in
further patterns of segregation. Consumption embodies the idea that the package of a
locality’s goods and services (e.g., the quality of its schools, the value of its homes, the
amount of its taxes, the appeal of its amenities) has become the primary means by which

206

Id.
See also Orfield, infra note __, at ___; Cashin, “Localism, Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of rhe Favored
Quarter,” supra note __ at 2003, n.99.; Richard Briffault, “The Local Government Boundary Problem in
Metropolitan Areas,” 48 Stan. L. Rev. 115, 1135-36 (1996).
208
Id., at 1993.
207

http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art44

Katrina’s Window

TROUTT

Page 57

middle-class people choose where to live. Like Tiebout’s consumer-voter,209 they shop.
Stark racial animus may not play a conscious role in their thinking, although there is
strong evidence that it still may.210 Instead, the objective economic categories contained
within land use schemes and reflected in real estate marketing subsume segregation.
Segregation is simply one of the characteristics of housing commodities in middle-class
housing markets. Concealed as an aspect of the market, it becomes the norm and often
goes unchallenged.211 As modes of consumption increasingly condition participation in
society, segregation risks becoming, like square footage, an unremarkable aspect of
residential value—or worse, it is presumed.
A fourth reason for localism’s succession is the role of politics in promoting
racial and economic distance (fragmentation) between communities of voters whose
interests might otherwise be shared. Decentralization creates a political framework for
parochialism. Political interests are easily narrowed.212 From an inter-local perspective,
the demands of localism require that municipalities act defensively against incursions as
well against each other. Inter-local cooperation is often difficult under this arrangement
unless dividing lines are clear. Economic segregation, especially as a proxy for race, is
just such a line. Thus, Republicans successfully exploited class and race antagonisms
following the legislative achievements of the civil rights movement, and pitted the

209

Charles Tiebout, A Theory of Local Expenditures [cite and explanatory note]
See, e.g., Rusk, ____, supra note __, at 318-324, discussing evidence of white racist attitudes on housing
choice.
211
[See Troutt, “Ghettoes Revisited,” (full cite) and related cites about consumption.]
For many people in the U.S. housing market, finding economically and/or racially integrated
communities is increasingly difficult. See generally, National Fair Housing Alliance, UNEQUAL
OPPORTUNITY—PERPETUATING HOUSING SEGREGATION IN AMERICA: 2006 Fair Housing
Trends Report (2006) available at,
http://www.nationalfairhousing.org/resources/newsArchive/resource_24256802754560627686.pdf
212
Cashin“Localism, Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of rhe Favored Quarter,” supra note __ at 2028-33;,
Briff make similar points]
210
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political interests of working- and lower middle-class whites against poor black recipients
of welfare.213 Affirmative action has also served as such a bright-line political wedge
issue, encompassing racial and economic fears among white voters.214 In any event,
decentralized governance may preclude opportunities for local coalition-building among
groups who are routinely separated from each other and are accustomed to viewing their
interests as at odds. According to Cashin’s analysis, these are the isolation effects of a
segregated political culture fueled by localism, which breeds its own cohesive strength.215
Finally, the analysis so far has implicitly assumed the opposition of white middleclass suburbanites, the primary consumers of segregation, to living in racially integrated
communities. However, the degree of Re-segregation today would almost certainly
require the cooperation of middle-class black people, at least so far as suburban racial
integration is concerned. Conventionally, we assume the interplay of two factors in
residential segregation, zoning exclusions and lack of economic means among blacks.
But zoning is not always a factor in racial segregation (especially in many southern areas
where urban planning regulations are less entrenched). Economic disparities are not
uniformly overwhelming. Something else is happening. The unscientific answer lies in
some form of pervasive discomfort, if not hostility, among black middle-class people to
213

See, e.g., Myron Orfield, Metropolitics 35-36 (Brookings Lustitution Press 1997)(describing political
alignments in the Minneapolis-St. Paul area); Lassiter, The Silent Majority, supra note __ at __ (arguing
that historical misconceptions about Richard Nixon’s “Southern Strategy” ignore the persuasiveness of
appeals to a “silent majority” of suburban whites whose themes would appeal to suburban voters for
decades).
214
[E.g., Torres & Guinear, The Miner’s Canary]
215
Sheryll Cashin analyzes these tendencies in the context of parochialism and institutionalization.
Parochialism results from homogenous political identities based narrowly on boundary lines, which blind
voters from natural allies beyond them. The more identity is connected to boundaries, the easier it is for
voters to choose their allies. The more homogeneity is chosen, the stronger and more cohesive those
communities’ exercise of local power. Localism, therefore, breeds its own strength., in part because it
fosters homogeneity as a uniting political interest.against outsiders. This dynamic contributes to regular
“mobilizations of bias”—a feature of what I call localism generally. Institutionalization, in Cashin’s terms,
describes the normalization of those parochial attitudes into the political status quo. “Localism, SelfInterest, and the Tyranny of the Favored Quarter,” supra note __ at 2015-2023.
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integration. That is, without the same formal barriers to black middle-class mobility as in
decades past, preferences for segregation may be cooperating forces. The New Orleans
scenario suggests a reason: Middle-class blacks are less willing to sacrifice—exactly
what is not clear—for racial integration.216
4.

What is Lost: Resistance Against Middle-Class Interest

As the durable successor to segregation, localism has produced unprecedented
wealth and community stability for millions of affluent and middle-income American
households. Yet the racial proxy on which it stands, economic segregation, necessarily
produces stunning inequalities. Persistent ghetto poverty among blacks concentrated in
resource-abandoned hulks of once-great cities has preconditioned incalculable social
instability and diminished economic opportunities for generations of households. In the
disastrous aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans’ historical march toward this
feature of Americanization proved fatal, ruinous and shameful. The tragedy of New
Orleans demonstrates the urgent need for equitable reform of legal localism on behalf of
the persistently poor and the cities in which they struggle. Localism’s exclusions have
obvious spillover effects, but none greater than the costs to cities and their residents.
However, those costs do not remain entirely within the city and its residents,
particularly when federal assistance to states for programs like affordable housing
development, health care and income assistance decrease and state taxpayers must make
up the difference. A growing body of research is showing that the costs of localism—

216

They have enclaves in older suburbs such as Jefferson Parish or the subdivisions of New Orleans East
instead. Unfortunately, these areas were devastated by Hurricane Katrina. See discussion supra at __, Part
II. For a stimulating discussion of the dimensions of black middle-class suburbanization and the various
costs associated with living in or outside predominantly white areas, see Sheryll D. Cashin, “Middle-Class
Black Suburbs and the State of Integration: A Post-Integrationist Vision for Metropolitan America,” 86
Cornell L. Rev. 729 (2001). [more]
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especially on the middle class—are even more direct than that. Specifically, the land
grab of suburban sprawl represents a costly waste of natural resources and environmental
damage.217 Cross-border effects may represent a combination of neighbor-to-neighbor
externalities or the aggregation of localist policies pursued by municipalities engaged in
necessary competition.218 The leapfrogging of consumer investment into “favored
quarters”219 leaves behind more and more moderate- and middle-income suburban
dwellers with increased taxes for lesser services.220 In many metropolitan areas around
the country, cities as well as older suburbs represent the “have-nots” of state finance,
which subsidize the lower taxes and infrastructural improvements of the “haves.” The

217

Suburban sprawl is fueled by the "iron triangle" of finance, land use planning, and transportation service
delivery. Sprawl-fueled growth is widening the gap between the "haves" and "have-nots." Suburban
sprawl has clear social and environmental effects. The social effects of suburban sprawl include
concentration of urban core poverty, closed opportunity, limited mobility, economic disinvestment, social
isolation, and urban/suburban disparities that closely mirror racial inequities. The environmental effects of
suburban sprawl include urban infrastructure decline, increased energy consumption, automobile
dependency, threats to public health and the environment, including air pollution, flooding, and climate
change, and threats to farm land and wildlife habitat. Many jobs have shifted to the suburbs and
communities where public transportation is inadequate or nonexistent. The exodus of low-skilled jobs to
the suburbs disproportionately affects central-city residents, particularly people of color, who often face
more limited choice of housing location and transportation in growing areas. Robert D. Bullard,
“ADDRESSING URBAN TRANSPORTATION EQUITY IN THE UNITED STATES,” 31 Fordham Urb.
L.J. 1183, 1201 (October 2004) The biggest problem is that “the decision of who lives where, particularly
given entrenched housing segregation, is not simply driven by choice.” Manuel Pastor, et. al., In the Wake
of the Storm: Environment, Disaster, and Race After Katrina, 1, 3 Russel Sage Foundation, NY 2006. In
his case study of Hurricane Katrina, Brian L. Levy discusses the concept of “environmental racism,” and
suggests residential segregation is responsible for it. He outlines ‘place stratification’, the concept that
certain places are more desirable to live in than others, as “[a]n important factor of residential inequality.”
He also highlights the significant role certain ‘institutional mechanisms’ play in allowing the dominant
group to retain control over the more desirable areas. Some of these mechanisms include: redlining,
exclusionary zoning, and the strategic placement of affordable housing units. Thus, the only way to ensure
equitable development, is to recognize the harm caused by these exclusionary mechanisms and plan
preventatively. Brian L. Levy, Bayou Blues: The Social Structure of a Disaster: A Case Study of Hurricane
Katrina (November 9, 2006) available at, http://www.uga.edu/juro/2006/levy.pdf.
218
Briffault, “The Local Government Boundary Problem,” 48 Stan. L. Rev. at 1133.
219
See discussion supra at note __; see also Orfield, Metropolitics, 5-7, discussion of real estate consultant
Christopher Leinberger and Robert Charles Lessor and Co’s use of the term to describe exclusive areas of
high services, low taxes and multiple barriers to housing affordable enough to support the many low-wage
workers needed for their job base.
220
See, e.g., Ken Belson, “In Success of 'Smart Growth,' New Jersey Town Feels Strain,” NY Times, B1
(April 9, 2007),
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structural inequality inherent in localism has reached past the urban periphery. As Myron
Orfield explains:
An area with high social needs and low resources is generally not a nice place to
live, with poor services and high taxes. Conversely, an area with high resources
and low social needs is a nice place to live, with good services and low taxes.
This process of polarization fuels itself as high-income individuals with broad
residential choices and businesses seek out pleasant places, good services, and
low taxes and avoid unpleasant places, poor services and high taxes. As the
favored quarter captures more and more high-income residents, its base increases,
taxes go down, and/or services improve. It becomes an even more attractive area.
But as individuals and businesses leave areas with high social need and high
taxes, the base shrinks and tax rates go up. The incentive to get out grows.221
Perhaps the greatest detriment of all is economic: Metropolitan areas that continue to
embrace localism at the expense of shared regional responsibilities tend to be less
competitive in attracting economic development, keeping businesses and jobs, and
maintaining a deep and talented labor pool.222 At a certain point, of course, constant
flight and leapfrogging may reflect market preferences, but this feature of localism—and
the legal and political deference to it—permits self-interested, irrational and inefficient
preferences to flourish at the expense of regions, cities and impoverished minority
communities within them.223
Meanwhile, we increasingly live our lives in non-local terms, since most of what
we do by necessity crosses jurisdictional lines. We often work in different towns or cities
than we live, shop in regional malls and store locations, eat and attend cultural events
221

Id., at 9. The most unstable suburbs are older, working-class localities without a dynamic tax base, even
more less stable than central cities. They are more easily overwhelmed by economic decline than central
cities, because the latter are better equipped institutionally and have more diverse resources. Id., at 31.
222
[multi cites and infra to See generally Manuel Pastor Jr., Peter Dreier, J. Eugene Grigsby III and Marta
Lopez-Garza, Regions That Work (University of Minnesota Press 2000) infra]. See also, Briffault, “The
Local Government Boundary Problem,” supra note __, 48 Stan. L. Rev. at 1139-41. “[I]nterlocal
competition, interlocal wealth disparities, and the resulting inferior services and infrastructure in central
cities can bring down the economic base of the region as a whle, making affluent areas as well as poorer
ones less well-off than they might have been had the region as a whole invested more in localities.” Id., at
1140.
223
See Cashin, “The Tyranny of the Favored Quarter,” supra note __, at 2012.
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throughout the metropolitan area and seek friendships and recreation across the region.
As a nation we now tend to sleep locally but live and work regionally. The anomaly is
that the myriad regional relationships that make up our actual lives are governed by a
contradicting web of local jurisdictional powers.224 Our tools of democratic decisionmaking, like our laws, take little account of regional realities.
The foregoing suggests that some form of regional governance may be closer to
what we want than localism. In theory, regional governance of planning issues critical to
the maintenance of middle-class concerns should not be politically hard to sell. Pervasive
frustration with the daily effects of sprawl link with traditional middle-class voter
concerns about the environment, traffic and preservation of natural resources.225 As a
result, urban growth boundaries should be more prevalent than they are.226 Where issues
clearly transcend local control and create waste, solutions are expensive and require the
fair allocation of tax burdens. Hence tax base sharing should be more prevalent than it
is.227 Notwithstanding the incomplete state of the evidence, arguments in favor of some
form of regional governance appear to support the best interests of a middle-class public.
Of course, if this were true, we would have much more of it. Instead, we have in
places like New Orleans and surrounding other major U.S. cities an often inefficient,
selectively democratic, inequality-producing legal norm of localism. Briffault argues that
a major reason localism remains entrenched in places where it is counterproductive is the
political power and discretion it provides local elites. “[T]he resistance to regionalism in
224

Briffault, “The Local Government Boundary Problem,” supra note __, at 1142-43.
[General cite]; See Rusk, supra note __, at 331-32; Cashin, “The Tyranny of the Favored Quarter,” supra
note __, at 2013.
226
See, e.g., Rusk, supra note __ at 159-161 (discussing process by which Portland, Oregon’s growth
boundaries were established). But see Briffault, “Our Localism I,” at 46 (arguing against urban growth
boundaries as having exclusionary effects in tightening housing markets).
227
See Rusk., supra note __ at 329 and discussion infra at ___.
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the political process is largely a matter of the self-interest of those who benefit from the
status quo, such as local elected officials, land developers, corporations that are the
subjects of interlocal bidding, and the businesses and residents located in the high-tax
base localities of the metropolitan area.”228
This is undoubtedly true of many older cities (including New Orleans), but the
criticism, I argue, illustrates a problem with even the best legal commentary on localism:
It fails to emphasize sufficiently legal localism’s succession as the instrument of post-war
de facto segregation. The demographic and economic events before, during and after
Hurricane Katrina in the New Orleans metro region help reveal localism’s irrational side.
The resistance to regionalism inherently reflects structural racism and anti-urbanism at a
time when such a political commitment militates against the economic interests of many
of its proponents. I agree with Briffault, Cashin and others about the principal remedy:
regional governance. The version I espouse can be called equitable regionalism, with
emphasis on local comprehensive planning with the force of law as a necessary
precondition. A discussion of the principle follows in Part IV.
Part IV: A General Blueprint for Equitable Regionalism
1.

Equitable Regionalism

In the foregoing analyses, I have attempted to demonstrate from an urbanist
perspective how the re-entrenchment of racial and economic segregation was facilitated
by this country’s legal and ideological commitment to localism. I have done so primarily
through the example of metropolitan New Orleans—before and after Hurricane Katrina—
an area whose original exceptionalism might have been a model for a racially divided
nation but whose capitulation to racially and politically distinct geography produced a
228

Briffault, “Our Localism I,” supra note __ at 27 (footnotes omitted).
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horrendous spectacle of dislocation, economic ruin, psychological devastation and death.
Given the scope of the underlying pattern in cities and the specific harms to New Orleans,
it is difficult to propose a workable remedy in this same analysis. What I hope to add,
however, is further support for regionalism as both an idea and a set of law reformoriented commitments. Antisegregation efforts have not typically focused on regionalism
with the same intensity that, for example, smart growth scholarship has. Nor has
planning been a central focus of urban legal scholars. I suggest that the preceding
analysis compels a focus on both regionalism and planning as a means to dismantling the
structure of residential segregation. Mindful that any state-level prescriptions are subject
to vast differences in state political organization, I propose a remedial principle called
equitable regionalism, which can be applied differently in different states. As the
definition which follows indicates, equitable regionalism is aimed at reducing structural
inequities that are routinely the product of localism. Therefore, this Part illustrates the
principle in the context of two important areas affecting community composition and
fiscal imbalances: sharing the distribution of affordable housing and sharing tax revenues
fairly across relevant regions. These examples are also consistent with an emphasis on a
planning approach, which, I have argued, offers a way out of localism’s segregative
effects without rejecting its core tenets. The Article concludes with some observations
about how best to integrate equitable regionalism with neighborhood planning,
particularly in inner cities where it has been lacking.
A. Definition and components. Most forms of regionalism recognize that many
issues affecting localities within a state are not susceptible to remedies by individual
municipalities, but must require inter-local cooperation at the behest (usually) of the state.
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Sprawl, water and sewer access, transportation, environmental regulation and even
economic development are examples of issues for regional governance in one form or
another. Equitable regionalism recognizes that issues with distinct equity implications
should be susceptible to regional cooperation because they are typically the subject of
localist opposition. Affordable and public housing, revenue sharing and density controls
are examples of issues for equitable regionalism. Yet equitable regionalism also
responds to the condition of large cities in metropolitan areas as well as to older suburbs
where poverty has concentrated among blacks and other minorities and which have lost a
significant tax base to more affluent suburbs. Those cities, like New Orleans, are often in
a fiscal free fall, particularly with respect to schools, social services and housing
assistance for their persistently poor residents, and their internal efforts to improve the
health, housing, education, income and safety concerns residents are rarely adequate.
Given the ideological resistance to racial and economic integration that inheres in
localism’s rules, equitable regionalism probably has to be imposed by state legislatively,
in ways that explicitly benefit middle-income residents, too, but through significant
reallocation of the costs and burdens associated with poverty. However, this type of
regionalism should produce more than efficiency gains from cost-spreading. Among the
myriad benefits associated with greater equity across regions are the increased “life
chances” or social capital—economic productivity and lower public services costs—of all
state residents. Poverty, we have seen, is expensive. Its costs, duration and prevalence
can be greatly reduced by a commitment to regional equity.
Therefore, equitable regionalism is a principle of local government law reform by
which states enact legislation to compel interlocal cooperation where equity (and often
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efficiency) demand it. Its goal is a more even distribution of state resources across
municipal populations, the transformation of marginal areas into more integrated
communities and the reduction of significant disparities in the provision of public and
private services among localities. It is constructive of efficient regional growth, and
destructive of localism’s tendencies toward racial segregation and poverty concentration.
Although I discuss only two issues here, affordable housing and tax revenue sharing,
equitable regionalism is also concerned with school finance, efficient public
infrastructure, improving the reach of public transportation, environmental preservation
and the just allocation of environmental burdens and hazards, creating optimal residential
densities and reducing sprawl. Some of these issue areas have been the province of local
planning authority with wasteful and inequitable results. Equitable regionalism,
therefore, would diminish local control of matters with clear regional implications and
manifest externalities. The principle may take many forms, from top-down to bottom-up,
voluntary and compulsory, population cut-offs (or locality size) for participation
requirements, commission-driven or/and legislative. A region like the New Orleans
metropolitan area is better served by a top-down, compulsory state legislation requiring
parishes within the region to provide for some portion of these components, through their
planning regulation with elected regional commission authority over compliance.
However, because the principle of equitable regionalism originates with the need
to share the burdens of major cities and poorer suburbs with their better-off regional
neighbors, it must realistically account for some of the missing advantages of suburban
localism. One of those is higher levels of political participation. Low-income urban
neighborhoods are generally places of low voter turn-out, weak organizational structures
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and limited opportunities for resident democratic participation. Many commentators
recognize the critical role of participation in building stable communities; Rodolphe
Desdunes and the radical Creoles of color had long ago argued for the preservation of
those rights as a condition of equal citizenship. Planning, I argue in the next section, is
the appropriate vehicle for greater democratic stakeholdership from the standpoint of
equitable regionalism. But planning and local sovereignty are not the same thing. The
latter is a feature of localism that is dependent on jurisdictional boundaries. For that
reason, the planning precondition I propose within the principle of equitable regionalism
is based on neighborhood units, not municipalities.
B. Rationales. The principle of equitable regionalism is premised on several
rationales, two of them equitable, two economic and the last ones on political
pragmatism. First, both racial and economic justice are seminal concerns in the political
fabric of the nation. The struggle for civil rights never fully progressed to a movement
for economic equity, in part because of the legal impediments denying fundamental
economic rights. However, the country’s shame, embarrassment and individual
generosity after Hurricane Katrina suggests that, while this interest has never been strong,
it is not negligible. Coupled with the empirically obvious overlap between class and race
in New Orleans, the twin rationales urge recognition of equitable regionalism.
Another equity rationale is remedying the fiscal disparities associated with socalled “favored quarters.” Where unequal state bargaining power creates fiscal
imbalances by which major cities and less-favored (but older) suburbs wind up
subsidizing expensive infrastructural extensions to newer, wealthier and exclusive
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suburbs, regional revenue balance mechanisms should be triggered.229 Equitable
regionalism would encourage the kind of fiscal transparency that would limit inequitable
inter-local subsidization by subjecting to more public scrutiny the formulas for allocation
of state infrastructure expenditures. In this way, the principle may help erode
antimajoritarian tendencies in state fiscal policy.
Economically, equitable regionalism is necessary to diminish the negative
externalities arising from increased inter-local interdependency, and to acknowledge that
interdependency in formal and mutually beneficial ways.230 The leapfrogging
phenomenon by which residents either leave older suburbs or enter an area’s newer
suburbs encourages the wasteful passing on of burdens (as do school closures and
wasteful duplication of public services in new population centers after old ones
decline).231 Moreover, many public goods transcend local boundaries, putting certain
localities in a better position than others to provide them. Efficiency, therefore, demands
regional cooperation. A related economic rationale is the greater regional
competitiveness that often comes with cooperative planning.232 As tax and poverty rates
decline, the area becomes more attractive to businesses and other institutions.
This diversity of economic rationales (provided they are supported by particular
regional facts on the ground) should allow for more frequent political alliances across
municipal boundaries. As Orfield counsels, the political challenge of regionalism in any
form is to show middle- and lower middle-class voters in suburbs with low and declining
229

See Cashin, “The Tyranny of the Favored Quarter,” supra norte __, a 1988. Sheryll Cashin’s empirical
support for these assertions is unparalleled. See also Briffault, “Our Localism II”, supra note __ at 38081.
230
For more on interdependency among regional actors, see Briffault, “The Local Government Boundary
Problem,” supra note __, at 1137-39.
231
See Cashin, “The Tyranny of the Favored Quarter,” supra note __, at 2003, n.99.
232
Pastor, Regions That Work discussion and see note __ supra.
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property tax values that their interests converge with central cities, that tax base sharing
will improve their services while lowering their taxes, that it will restrict their fair
housing commitments to regional standards, and that it will stabilize their communities
against further decline.233
2.

Legislative Priorities

The country’s largest cities have been sapped of their fiscal capacity to grow and
provide the social capital inputs needed by concentrated, low-income households
deliberately left behind by generations of suburban localism’s legally protected policies
of segregation. The continuing crisis in New Orleans is tragic evidence of a resource
imbalance that can produce fatal effects. That illustrative metropolitan failure argues for
regionalist reform—specifically, equitable regionalism—by which state power is engaged
to mandate inter-local cooperation around, at a minimum, the issues that localism
consistently rejects at the expense of a widening array of a state’s working- and middleclass communities. Next, I examine two such issues at the core of the equitable
regionalism principle, fair sharing of affordable housing and greater proportionality in
the allocation of increased tax revenues to show how these priorities may work in
practice.
A. Sharing Affordable Housing. Nothing is more expensive to cities or more
corrosive of social capital development than racially concentrated poverty, a
socioeconomic condition produced by massive suburban resistance to housing designated
for even moderate-income households. Given the history of local resistance,
municipalities must be compelled to provide real opportunities for affordable housing

233

Orfield, Metropolitics, supra note __, at 37. “On the merits, these middle-income, blue collar suburbs
are the largest prospective winners in regional reform.” Id., at 13.
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development which explicitly seek racial as well as economic balance across
metropolitan areas.234 There are a number of compulsory means, including inclusionary
zoning235 (with or without strong market mechanisms), state legislative regional housing
formulas (sometimes within planning requirements), and housing incentive programs
(carrot or stick approaches). The key, however, is to fashion mandatory rules that
preclude competitive rule breaking at the local level or steady evisceration through loop
holes or non-enforcement. This may entail the creation of regional oversight bodies,
whose members are both elected and appointed, and charged with ensuring fair
compliance with state-mandated housing goals.
Regional inclusionary housing schemes usually require a percentage of housing
units affordable to an established median income guideline as a condition of residential
development permitting in a given area.236 For instance, Montgomery County, Maryland,
passed a Moderately Priced Dwelling Unit (MPDU) ordinance which mandates that 15%

234

A great many experiments in regional fair share housing fail because of municipalities’ efforts to fill
affordable units with the elderly, recently divorced white women and college students. While these
demographic groups have real needs for affordable housing opportunities in stable communities, favoring
them over harder to house low-income black and Latino families systematically compounds the problem
fair share planning is meant to alleviate.
235
See Angela Glover Blackwell, “Equitable Gulf Coast Renewal: Creating Housing Opportunity Through
Inclusionary Zoning,” Policy Link, available at, http://www.americanprogress.org/kf/policylink_brief.pdf
(last visited February 23, 2007)(providing a brief discussion on inclusionary zoning, where Blackwell
argues that, “inclusionary zoning is an essential policy strategy to avoid the re-concentration of poverty in
New Orleans and ensure the fair distribution of affordable housing across the city and surrounding region.”
She points to existing patterns of income and racial segregation, provides statistics about New Orleans prior
to Katrina, and concludes inclusionary zoning is “an important tool to guide more balanced and equitable
housing development patterns in New Orleans.” See generally Juergensmeyer & Roberts, Land Use
Planning and Development Regulation Law (West 2003) at sec. 6.7.
236
See generally Nick Brunick, Lauren Goldberg and Susannah Levine, Business Professional People for
the Public Interest, Large Cities and Inclusionary Zoning 1-17, 5 (2003), available at
www.bpichicago.org/rah/pubs/keeping_for_sale.pdf; Karen Destorel Brown, A Discussion Paper Prepared
by The Brookings Institution Center on Urban Metropolitan Policy, Expanding Affordable Housing
Through Inclusionary Zoning: Lessons From The Washington Metropolitan Area, (2001) available at
www.brookings.edu/es/urban/knight/references.pdf - 2003-12-01. They can be required at either the local
or regional level.
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of all new development over fifty units must go to moderate-income buyers or renters.237
Additional affordable housing comes through a provision allowing the county’s Housing
Opportunities Commission (public housing authority) to purchase up to a third of the
units.238
A second approach maintains regional fair share housing allocations by imposing
obligations through comprehensive plan elements, which must be periodically submitted
by municipalities to regional authorities created by state legislation and meet established
regional housing needs at different income levels.239 This planning regulation combines
consistency requirements with regional equity. For instance, California requires
municipalities to submit a housing element (as well as others), which includes an
extensive housing needs inventory and goals statement for the locality relative to the
surrounding region.240 The housing element is then part of a city’s regional fair share
allocation.241 In New Jersey, the famed Mt. Laurel fair share housing litigation was

237

Montgomery County Code sec. 25A-1 (2006). David Rusk, Inside Game/Outside Game, supra note __,
at 184-90.
238
Montgomery County Code sec. 25A-1 (2006). . Builders can negotiate density bonuses in exchange.
Low- to moderate-income buyers may sell their subsidized units after ten years, but a portion of the
proceeds must go to the county’s revolving Housing Initiative Fund. Id.
239
Cf. Daniel R. Mandelker, “Twists In The Path From Mount Laurel: The Affordable Housing Element in
Comprehensive Plans,” 30 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 555, 565 (arguing that the practice may overstate the
availability of land in older suburbs and concerned that imposing affordable housing may contribute to
sprawl).
240
See Cal Gov Code § 65583 (2006):
The housing element shall consist of an identification and analysis of existing and projected
housing needs and a statement of goals, policies, quantified objectives, financial resources, and
scheduled programs for the preservation, improvement, and development of housing. The housing
element shall identify adequate sites for housing, including rental housing, factory-built housing,
and mobilehomes, and shall make adequate provision for the existing and projected needs of all
economic segments of the community.
Massachusetts makes similar requirements, including an extensive array of required elements. See ALM
GL ch. 41, § 81D (2007). Elements include, among others, land use, housing, economic development,
natural and cultural resources, open space and recreation, and circulation.
241
Cal. Gov. Code § 65584 (2007) provides in part:
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ultimately reduced to a legislative scheme for regional affordability allocations with
many of the same features.242 Unfortunately, the state legislature’s inclusion of a localist
provision and regional contribution agreements, largely undermined the fair share scheme
by permitting municipalities to buy out up to half their designated housing obligations
and reconcentrating those affordable units (at a discount) in the state’s already
overburdened cities.243 The Mt. Laurel experience remains a cautionary reminder about
the level of political resistance localities will mount in order to avoid affordable housing
obligations under regional governance.244 In recognition of these political realities, at
least one commentator has argued in favor of a system of housing incentives under which
resistant localities paid the equivalent of a tax for avoiding their desegregation

(d) The regional housing needs allocation plan shall be consistent with all of the following
objectives:
(1) Increasing the housing supply and the mix of housing types, tenure, and affordability in all
cities and counties within the region in an equitable manner, which shall result in each jurisdiction
receiving an allocation of units for low and very low income households.
(2) Promoting infill development and socioeconomic equity, the protection of environmental and
agricultural resources, and the encouragement of efficient development patterns.
(3) Promoting an improved intraregional relationship between jobs and housing.
(4) Allocating a lower proportion of housing need to an income category when a jurisdiction
already has a disproportionately high share of households in that income category, as compared to
the countywide distribution of households in that category from the most recent decennial United
States census.
242

N.J. Stat. Ann. Secs. 52:27D-301-329 (West 2007). [COAH provisions specifically?]
Id., at sec. 312. See Joel Norwood, “Trading Affordable Housing Obligations: Selling A Civic Duty or
Buying Efficient Development?” 39 Conn. L. Rev. 347 (2006); Lee Anne Fennell, “Properties of
Concentration,” 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1227, 1229 (2006); Peter Schuck, “Judging Remedies: Judicial
Approaches to Housing Segregation,” 37 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 289, 313 (2002); John M. Payne,
Lawyers, Judges, and the Public Interest, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 1685, 1688-90 (1998).
244
See, e.g., Nicole Garnett, “Trouble Preserving Paradise,” 87 Cornell L. Rev. 158 (2001) [check cite and
give paren], David D. Troutt, “Mount Laurel and Urban Possibility,” 27 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1471, 1475-77
(1997).
243
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obligations;245 New Jersey may already demonstrate that many suburban municipalities
are willing to pay such costs as the price of continued local control.
The benefits of economic and racial desegregation through either of the means
discussed above is reflected by a single empirical fact about concentrated urban poverty:
It is virtually unknown to the white poor. In fact, in New Orleans, while 43% of blacks
lived in concentrated poverty, only 11% of whites did.246 Instead, poor whites are
economically integrated in more moderate- and middle-income neighborhoods and
localities. This means they share in many of the same social capital inputs (schools,
recreation, economic investment, role models, employment opportunities, etc.) enjoyed
by more affluent neighbors. The white poor cannot be ignored politically, and their
political interests are nevertheless shared by others in the locality. Although the causal
link is not exact, poor whites do not stay persistently poor, acquire more wealth than the
minority poor, and enjoy greater better economic mobility over their lives.247 Hence,
from the experience of the white poor, economic integration (or social and political
resource sharing) alone seems to be a significant factor in improving life chances and
mobility. Further, the spatial coexistence between poor whites and middle-class whites

245

See John Charles Boger, “Toward Ending Residential Segregation: A Fair Share Proposal For The Next
Reconstruction,” 15 N.C. L. Rev. 1573 (1993). Under his proposed National Fair Share Act, Professor
Boger would include the following provision:
As an incentive, the Act would promise to disperse new federal housing funds through state
governments to all municipalities that choose to shoulder their "fair share" housing obligations. As
a disincentive, this legislation would modify the federal tax code so that property holders in
municipalities that choose to ignore their prescribed housing goals would progressively lose their
mortgage interest and property tax deductions. These tax code modifications would have a dual
purpose: First, to prompt citizens to encourage municipalities to comply with federal law, thereby
hastening metropolitan integration; second, to reverse the economic advantages that currently flow
toward property holders in segregated communities. Id., at 1574.
246
247

Brookings Institution, “After the Storm,” supra note __, at 7.
See Massey & Denton, American Apartheid, supra note __, at 123-142; [see also: Sheriden, Jargowsky]
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demonstrates that poverty alone does not doom property values, destroy a tax base or ruin
schools.
B. Revenue Balance/Tax Base Sharing. Tax base sharing is almost the
conceptual antidote to the concentration effects of wealth and poverty exacerbated by the
localist compulsion toward fiscal zoning. Where localities find it prudent to attract “good
ratables” such as easily taxed commercial and industrial properties and to repel “bad
ratables” such as low- and moderate-income housing for familes in need of costly public
services,248 regional tax base sharing changes the logic by de-emphasizing the primacy of
jurisdictional borders. Rather than measuring one municipality’s ability to successfully
compete against its neighbors for good ratables and, in the process, create costly regionwide externalities in infrastructure, traffic, pollution and sprawl, the regional interest is
made paramount and the norm of intergovernmental competition is replaced with a more
equitable and efficient norm of inergovernmental cooperation. There are two essential
methods that are applied statutorily to defined regions within a state. One is to create a
baseline tax valuation for commercial and industrial development, and every increase in
value over time as well as new developments are subject to an assessment for a regional
fund.249 Distributions from the fund are made according to a formula that allows
municipalities with high services costs but limited tax base to participate in a nearby
community’s gains.250 The second approach is similar, but uses appreciating residential
values as the property taxes subject to the regional distribution formula.251 In addition to
248

For more on municipalities’ ratables compulsion, see Briffault, “The Local Government Boundary
Problem,” supra note __, at 1136.
249
American Planning Association, Growing Smart Legislative Guidebook, Ch. 14,
http://www.planning.org/guidebookhtm/chapter_fourteen_1.htm (last visited 7/23/07)(hereinafter, “APA
Growing Smart Guidebook”)..
250
Id. The chapter also contains useful illustrative formulas, calculations and model legislation.
251
Id. See also, Myron Orfield, Metropolitics, supra note ___, at 85.
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providing a balancing source of revenues for tax poor municipalities, tax base sharing
may rein in the forces of decline even among municipalities who win short-term fiscal
zoning contests but lose in the long term through low-density sprawl.252
The premier example of property tax base sharing as a feature of equitable
regionalism is the fiscal disparities legislation enacted by the Minnesota legislature in
1971.253 The Minnesota Fiscal Disparities Act “requires each taxing jurisdiction in a
seven-county area to contribute to a regional pool forty percent of the growth in the value
of its commercial-industrial tax capacity. Municipalities are assigned a portion of that
pool, based on population and the ratio of the total market value of property per capita in
the jurisdiction to the average market value of property per capita in the region.”254 In
2000, Orfield reported that sharing under the Act had reduced interlocal tax base
disparities by about twenty percent; in cities of more than 9,000 people, the ratio of
disparity had declined from 16:1 to 4:1.255 Orfield notes that the program would be even
stronger if a greater percentage of commercial tax base valuation were included in the
collection formula and if it could also draw from rising home values.256 Further, it is not

252

Id. According to Orfield, “In itself, intrametropolitan competition for tax base harms the entire region,
not just the city that loses. When cities engage in bidding wars for businesses that have already chosen to
locate in a region, public monies are used to improve one community’s fiscal position and services at the
expense of another’s well being. Businesses can take advantage of this competition to shed social
responsibilities. By threatening to leave, they can force troubled communities to pay them to stay.” Id., at
86-87.
253
Id., See Minn. Stat. Ann. Chaps. 473F.01-08 (Metropolitan revenue distribution) (1994 and Cum. Supp.
1996).
254
Myron Orfield and Nicholas Wallace, “The Minnesota Fiscal Disparities Act of 1971: The Twin Cities’
Struggle and Blueprint for Regional Cooperation,” 33 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 591, 592 (2007).
255
Id., at 603.
256
Orfield, Metropolitics, supra note ___, at 87.
Minnesota is not the only state to experiment with tax revenue sharing legislation. In 1968, for
example, the New Jersey legislature passed a tax base sharing law, N.J.S.A. §§13:17-60 to 13:17-76 ,for the
creation of a Haceknsack Meadowlands District, which covered fourteen municipalities around the
marshlands supporting the Meadowlands sports complex. APA Growing Smart Guidebook, supra note
___. “The plan's intent was to com-pensate those municipalities for the fiscal impact of land-use decisions
made by the commission. Each municipality contributes to an ‘intermunicipal account’ in an amount equal
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clear to what extent the Minnesota program would work to alter racial segregation (or if it
would be politically viable at all) in a metropolitan area with a more substantial black
population.257 In 2000, the proportion of blacks in the Minneapolis metropolitan area
was only 6.1%.258 By contrast, blacks made up 37.7 percent of the New Orleans
metropolitan area during the same period.
3.

Comprehensive Planning and Neighborhood Participation

Equitable regionalism is not a workable principle for cities and their poor unless
certain localist structures are in place to ensure that cities plan comprehensively and with
the maximum participation of all their residents. In the abstract, participatory planning is
localism’s greatest strength, because the community’s will about health, safety and
welfare is transformed into rational processes that tend to protect the broadest range of
stakeholder interests. In theory, the danger of a professionalized planning elite running
away with delegated powers is offset by an informed, often vigilant electorate as well as
by the legal strictures associated with comprehensive planning—specifically, the
requirement that zoning decisions, for instance, be consistent with a master plan (the
consistency or “force of law” requirement). Not all localities follow these rules; not all
states impose them. Many, like Louisiana, do not mandate that local land use regulation
conform to comprehensive planning goals, or even that the latter be adopted. In
sufficiently small, especially suburban, municipalities, where interest in land use decision
making is fairly uniform among residents, such localist “planning” schemes (focused
to a percentage of increases in assessed valuation of property within the district, starting from the base year
of 1970.” Id.
257
Cashin offers a similar, though broader, caveat about regionalist experiments, “The Local Government
Boundary Problem,” supra note __, at 2037.
258
Lois M. Quinn and John Pawasarat, Racial Integration in Urban America: A Block Level Analysis of
African American and White Housing Patterns,by, Employment and Training Institute, School of
Continuing Education, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, December 2002,
http://www.uwm.edu/Dept/ETI/integration/integration.htm#table2 (last visited 7/25/07).
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largely on zoning and exercised through local zoning ordinances) are adequate to protect
homeowner stakeholders.
Yet in larger cities whose residents would most benefit from the protections of
rational planning processes and the formal participation of the public in determining
community character, comprehensive planning is rare, often an afterthought. This is a
problem for democracy as well as for cities. Localism need not be viewed merely as a
means by which homogenous communities sustain parochial interests against change
from outsiders. Localism can and should tap the energy and resources of residents,
particularly at the neighborhood level where differences may be most dynamic, access to
information is more equal and where a true fabric of community may be most effectively
sewn through the exchange of experiences.259 The formal participation process may take
many forms, but an established model is comprehensive planning. The primary benefit
of promoting comprehensive planning at neighborhood levels is goal-setting, which is
itself impossible without an exchange of information about what currently exists in an
area, an assessment of needs and a frank, professional disclosure of constraints.
Comprehensive planning in this manner can develop even a low-income area’s sense of
collective voice, political empowerment and a future orientation necessary to any notion
of stakeholdership. With the aid of professional planners (as discussed below in the New
Orleans rebuilding context) and a regulatory scheme demanding legal compliance with
the resulting master plan, communities may strengthen themselves against the vagaries of
unforgiving political and economic markets, rather than appear defensively at the crisis
point of an unwanted environmental threat or a mysterious wave of displacing

259

Jerry Frug, Decentering Decentralization, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 253, 273-79 (1993) (arguing that citizens
feel strongest pull toward participation in their immediate neighborhoods).
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gentrification. Of greatest importance here, cities whose communities regularly engage
in comprehensive planning with the force of law are better situated to see themselves in
regional context and to contribute to and gain from processes of equitable regionalism.260
Larger cities that do not structure planning rules to have the force of law risk alienating
residents as a result of vesting ultimate decisionmaking power within the discretion of
local elected officials where accountability is hampered by a lack of transparency.261
UNOP and New Orleans. New Orleans had no such tradition of local
comprehensive planning and citizen participation until Katrina destroyed the city. After
several fits and starts, a process (still underway) entitled the Unified New Orleans Plan
was undertaken. Although efforts to give this model of public participation the force of
law sufficient to overcome a studied tradition of councilmanic zoning discretion and
weak neighborhood inputs are incomplete at this writing, the broad ideas bear brief
mention here.
The Unified New Orleans Plan262 (“UNOP”) appears to be the latest, and final
effort to create a comprehensive rebuilding plan, and was officially endorsed on July 5,
2006.263 The plan’s Community Support Organization was to coordinate a plan for each

260

See generally Peter Marcuse, “Rebuilding a Tortured Past or Creating a Model Future: The Limits and
Potentials of Planning,” in Hartman and Squires, There Is No Such Thing As a Natural Disaster, supra note
__, 271 (discussing the variety of productive roles planners can assume and the socioeconomic effects of
more equity-minded strategies).
261
See discussion infra at __.
262
See UNOP, “Final Draft of the Citywide Strategic Recovery and Rebuilding Plan” available at,
http://unifiedneworleansplan.com/home2/ (last visited March 3, 2007)(provides a link to each section of the
report)
263
Press Release, Mayor, City Council And Civic Leaders Reach Accord; “Unified New Orleans
Neighborhood Plan” To Guide Rebuilding Process For City (July 5, 2006) available at,
http://www.rockfound.org/about_us/press_releases/2006/no_pr070506.pdf.
The responsibility of oversight for this plan belongs to the New Orleans Community Support
Foundation (“NOCSF”), a six member board, and subsidiary of the Greater New Orleans Foundation
(“GNOF”). The NOCSF was responsible for staffing the process. They began by hiring the architecture
firm, Concordia, which put an advisory board in place called the, Community Support Organization
(“CSO”). The CSO consists of nine members. UNOP, ‘What is the Unified New Orleans Plan,’
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of the city’s thirteen districts.264 Because a major focus of UNOP was to incorporate
community feedback and ensure the planning process was ‘resident-driven’,265 this
planning process involved various city-wide meetings. In addition to the various
planners assigned to each individual district, a city-wide planning team was also
created266 in order “to both issue criteria for drafting the district plans and to produce the
single, unified document at the end of the process.”267 After collecting public response
and gathering information through the planning teams, the findings and recommendations
were collected in a five-section report now known as UNOP.268

http://unifiedneworleansplan.com/home2/section/22/ (last visited March 3, 2007). The composition of the
board includes “one appointee each from the Mayor's office, the New Orleans City Council, the City
Planning Commission, the Greater New Orleans Foundation, and five members representing the
community from each of the five City Council districts.” Press Release,UNOP, Community Support
Organization Members Announced; Assignments for District and Neighborhood Planning (August 28,
2006) available at, http://thinknola.com/w/images/1/1e/Members_announced-08-28-06-19600.pdf. The
CSO “was organized as a new governance model bringing the community directly into the decision making
process of the city's planning initiative.” Id. The CSO was in place to “oversee all major steps within the
planning process,”id., and would be in charge of selecting and overseeing the work of planning teams. Id.
264
Id.
265
Coleman Warner, “Major grants for N.O. depend on consensus,” NOLA.com (August 7, 2006) available
at, http://www.nola.com/newslogs/topnews/index.ssf?/mtlogs/nola_topnews/archives/2006_08_07.html.
266
UNOP, ‘Meet the Citywide Team,’ http://unifiedneworleansplan.com/home2/section/23-108/ (last
visited March 3, 2007).
267
NOLAPlans, supra note 3.
268
The first section, entitled ‘Recovery Assessment’ discusses New Orleans’ outlay prior to the storm, as
well as the division of the thirteen planning districts. See UNOP, at http://www.willdoostorage.com/Plans/CityWide/UNOPFINAL_1.pdf . It provides maps of the districts and neighborhoods,
and a brief overview of Katrina’s physical impact with maps depicting the flooded areas. The second
section, called ‘Citywide Recovery Framework’ provides various plans and predictions involved in the
UNOP process. See id., at, 2.pdf . It estimates population growth over the next ten years and assesses what
the planning implications may be given such estimates. It divides the assessments based on five drainage
basins, each of which encompass anywhere from one to seven districts. This section outlines seven
recovery goals and provides three recovery scenarios: 1) Repair, 2) Rehabilitate, and 3) Re-vision. The
section incorporates community feedback on the various scenarios gathered from the community meetings.
The third section provides an overview of the recovery policies, programs, and projects. It divides the
projects by sectors and provides charts for each sector that compares citywide plans for each sector, to the
individual district plans that are necessary for, and correspond to, the citywide project. It also includes a
timeline for implementation and UNOP’s prioritization criteria for each project. See id., at 3.pdf . Section
four begins with an implementation timeline across three phases of the project: 1) short-term, which
shows the required investment between 2007-2009, 2) mid-term, which shows the required investment
between 2009-2011; and 3) long-term, which shows the required investment between 2012-2016. It
outlines the necessary oversight for the rebuilding process, and calls for collaboration between various local
authorities. More importantly, however, this section encourages new zoning and regulatory approaches. It
suggests updates to the existing Master Plan and the Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance. See id., at 4.pdf .
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While many praise UNOP for involving New Orleanians and sharing the process
with the community,269 many more remain skeptical and some communities angry about
the planning process.270 The skepticism surrounds the plan’s feasibility, and the anger
relates to the impact this plan will have on lower income families.271 Their criticisms
have merit insofar as they critique processes which fail to restructure a local planning and
political structure that is both outdated and parochial in its priorities. Its chief problem is
the lack of a consistency requirement between planning initiatives and a comprehensive
plan, a product of a weak planning commission and a strong city council.272 However,
the process of planning, reviewand crititique by experts around the country has revealed a
great deal about the fault lines in city planning and participatory democracy in New

The final section of the plan is the financial section. It breaks down the total $4.1 billion of estimated costs
based on the various sectors and shows the approximate costs for the next two years, the next five years,
and the costs that stretch beyond five years. This section also discusses the general strategies in place to
secure funding, listing the various governmental (state and federal) agencies that are potential funding
sources as well as the various private entities that have or may contribute to UNOP. See id., at 5.pdf.
269
James S. Russell, “$14 Billion New Orleans Plan May Strand Neighborhoods,” Bloomberg.com
(February 14, 2007) available at,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=email_en&refer=muse&sid=awsIN03BZSDs.
270
See generally, Manuel Roig-Franzia, “Hostility Greets Katrina Recovery Plan” Washington Post
(January 12, 2006) available at, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/01/11/AR2006011102146.html (Describing the community’s outrage to UNOP’s
proposed moratorium on the city’s most damaged neighborhoods.)
271
For example, one organization focused on New Orleans’ poor, ACORN (Association of Community
Organizations for Reform Now), released its own plan. ACORN Housing/University Partnership, “A
Peoples’ Plan for Overcoming the Hurricane Katrina Blues: a comprehensive strategy for building a more
vibrant, sustainable, and equitable 9th Ward” (January 6, 2007) available at,
http://www.crp2.net/outreach/nopi/Peoples_Plan_for_9th_Ward.pdf. According to ACORN, the district
planning teams were not required to address issues such as health care, public safety, building codes,
transportation, eonomic and development, land use and institutional development—i.e., the infrastructure
of community development. Id., at 7.
272
Unlike its counterparts in most other American cities, the [City Planning Commission] does not have the
force of law behind its decisions, meaning that all development and infrastructure proposals are vetted by
the notoriously political City Council that has already demonstrated hostility to the UNOP process.
[However] [e]ven if its decisions did have legal standing, the City Planning Commission is currently
operating with less than half of its pre-storm staff, and is unlikely to serve as an effective advocate for city
rebuilding without a major overhaul and infusion of resources. See Jedidah Horne and Brendan Nee, “An
Overview of Post-Katrina Planning in New Orleans,” Department of City and Regional Planning,
University of California (October 18, 2006) available at, http://www.bnee.com/wpcontent/uploads/2006/10/An_Overview_of_the_Unified_New_Orleans_Planning_Process.pdf
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Orleans, which may not be unique to the city.273 Despite the criticism, the UNOP process
and the others undertaken in the alternative illustrate the beginnings of a potentially
formidable urban planning infrastructure capable of providing the democratic foundation
at the neighborhood level that is a practical precondition to effective equitable
regionalism.
4.

Barriers to Reform
The foregoing proposals’ normative appeal is certain to suffer prudential

constraints, given the analysis of resistance, rationality and cultural distance that
preceded it. To the extent that my analysis in this difficult context proposes a fruitful
coalition of state-wide interests to dismantle structures of racial and economic
disadvantage based on facts, I acknowledge the persuasive impotence of providing more

273

As Home and Nee further observed:
City’s current zoning ordinance was prepared at a time when local planners expected the city’s
extractive, manufacturing, transportation, retail, financial, and tourism industries to continue to
grow, albeit at a modest pace, and the residential neighborhoods to remain stable.
The 9th Ward is zoned to accommodate: moderate density residential development; neighborhoodoriented retail; three east-west commercial corridors; major industrial areas; significant rail, barge,
and ship-related transportation functions; and a small number of public open spaces. Recent
declines in the region’s oil and gas, shipping, and assembly industries have left the 9th Ward with
large swaths of underutilized and, in some cases, heavily-polluted industrial
areas. . . .
Economic declines in the above-mentioned industries in recent years have undermined the
economic opportunities for workers in these industrial sectors, causing many to seek employment
elsewhere. This factor, along with the development of newer suburban developments offering
larger homes, better infrastructure, and improved schools and municipal services, has resulted in a
slow but steady decline in the 9th Ward’s residential population . . . .
The post-disaster planning recovery efforts required by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita provide
residents, business owners, and elected officials from the 9th Ward with the opportunity to work
with city planners to revise the area’s zoning ordinance in response to long-term economic and
demographic trends, Katrina and Rita impacts, and contemporary and future building trends and
land use patterns. Id.
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information.274 I am also aware that the inherently political nature of these proposed
reforms may lead to death by popular referenda, if not by state legislatures.275
Hopefully, three more facts make the present situation different than failed efforts
of the past. First, we may be approaching the end-game in terms of the ability to simply
develop more state lands while abandoning others. Beyond the sheer waste and
environmental degradation that occurs through leapfrogging sprawl, there is finitude for
every flight strategy. Second, as Cashin, Orfield and others make clear, the fiscal
problems occurring in many suburbs compared to a state’s favored quarters may fuel
demands for greater transparency about the distribution of state revenues and resources.
Illuminating systemic cross-subsidization, therefore, promises the possibility of classbased coalitions seeking regional fairness (along with significant opposition), which has
worked before.276 Third, with a clearer mutuality of interests, regional equity coalitions
should attract many more politically powerful interests, including smartgrowth,
transportation alternatives and environmental advocates. If so, out of decades of
structural inequity may come the transformative realization that often what is good for
the state’s poor also benefits its middle class.
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Conclusion
The worst national disaster in United States history also showcased the dire
consequences of localism as the cultural and legal successor to segregation. Long before
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita devastated the Gulf Coast, New Orleans’ status as an
exceptional city had been lost to Americanizing trends. Its resistance to the conventional
racial binary was overcome after Reconstruction; its unique densities and accommodation
of the physical landscape were transformed into sprawling divisions by technology and
suburbanization. From the Brown decision forward, I have argued in this Article, New
Orleans and the metropolitan area around it developed much like the rest of the nation.
Localist tendencies combined with legal protections for local autonomy—as exemplified
and supported by several key decisions of the Burger Court—to resegregate the region.
A decade before Katrina, New Orleans, like most central cities, was financially incapable
of deconcentrating neighborhoods of persistent poverty and politically powerless to wrest
a more equitable sharing of state fiscal resources and burdens from its neighboring
parishes.
This analytic focus on the role of legal localism in resegregating America’s
metropolitan regions suggests its own remedial principle: equitable regionalism. Under
this principle of state legislative reform, political coalitions may be possible in joining the
interests of antipoverty, fair housing and community development advocates with their
counterparts in smartgrowth, environmental preservation and antisprawl organizations.
Urban neighborhoods chronically destabilized by poverty need localism’s emphasis on
participation through planning devices; similar devices may help to effectuate equitable
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regional goals. The current antimajoritarian rules have weakened both cities and a great
many suburbs, suggesting ultimately that what benefits the isolated urban poor may also
improve the welfare of the suburban middle class.
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